Jobst,After thinking about your recent example: > 33: A1>A>A2 >> B > 33:
A2>A>A1 >> B > 33: B >> A1,A2,A>and the 66 A-voters try to cooperate to elect
A by unanimously approving >of her, then they still get A only with a low
probability of 16/81 >(approx. 20%) while A1 and A2 keep a probabili
Dear Jobst,
I think you are right: Plain random ballot (as fall back) induces full
cooperation at lower values of alpha than does a mixture of plain and approval
random ballot, since the penalty is greater for failing to cooperate in the
former case.
However, given a value of alpha for which
Back to the initial set-up. Who should win in this example?
If the A group is going to win in any case then they could agree that
A is a good compromise candidate (and make his probabilities high).
On the other hand A1 is the Condorcet winner, which would make him a
good compromise candidat
Dear Jobst,
Here's an example I worked out based on the scenario
33: A1>A>A2>>B
33: A2>A>A1>>B
33: B ,
with A rated at 80% in both A factions, while the A1 and A2 factions rate A2 and
A1,
(anti)respectively, at 50% .
So both A factions slightly prefer A to a coin flip between A1 and A2.
