current proposal of counting political
proportionality at national level and then using that information to
elect representatives at the district level).
Juho
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still force the results to be geographically
proportional.)
Methods that measure the distance between voters and candidates in
detail could lead to some interesting consequences like strategic
house buying. :-)
Juho
e the situation in some other way).
Juho
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E
On Aug 26, 2008, at 12:38 , Raph Frank wrote:
On 8/26/08, Juho <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
On Aug 26, 2008, at 1:20 , Raph Frank wrote:
Each candidate can register in any number of polling stations
covering
at most N seat's worth of population. (N=5 might be reasonable).
You
that would seem probable they might then try to find districts where
there are no other competing candidates of the same party. This could
lead to instability, or alternatively to party telling each candidate
which districts to pick.
One could use also the coordinates of the homes of the voters and get
rid of some of the polling station location related speculation. (One
would be pretty much forced to use the computerized (personal)
candidate lists that I mentioned in my other mail.)
Juho
On Aug 26, 2008, at 10:22
of represented voters equal to all
representatives. In short, distribution of representatives would be
close to the distribution of the voters (while still maintaining also
political proportionality).
Juho
On Aug 27, 2008, at 1:41 , Raph Frank wrote:
On Tue, Aug 26, 2008 at 9:42 P
displays
the personal alternatives and then prints a ballot. This solution
hides the personalized nature of the ballot and still avoids the
problem of voter voting for candidates that he/she should not vote.
Juho
On Aug 27, 2008, at 1:37 , Raph Frank wrote:
On Tue, Aug 26, 2008 at 9:41 PM
ght/feminist opinions. And since the three would be from a
relatively small set (maybe 5 out of 100) the number of combinations
might still be safe (reduce the allowed number of ranked candidates
to two or one if needed).
Juho
__
cal proportionality split. Out of these we could elect e.g. the
one where the average distance to the nearest representative is lowest.
Juho
My "two linked ballots" idea would probably work, but I think we
can do better by using the dista
ation to the voters on how
their representatives are going to vote may be essential. There may
be many different rules. Rules may be different for decisions on
seats vs. decisions. I'll skip examples since this mail is already long.
Juho
On Aug 28, 2008, at 21:33 , Abd ul-Rahman L
mong the citizens. Many citizens feel that the
parties just continue on their old tracks no matter how one votes.
With party internal branches the ability of the voters to influence
the political direction of
nce is probably quite good.
Juho
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of the favourite candidate is
very high. That candidate would however be listed somewhere close to
the end of the list.
Juho
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On Aug 31, 2008, at 15:25 , Raph Frank wrote:
On Sat, Aug 30, 2008 at 5:46 PM, Juho <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
To gain even
better trust that this set is the best one one could publish the
best found
set and then wait for a week and allow other interested parties to
seek for
even
On Aug 31, 2008, at 22:28 , Markus Schulze wrote:
Juho wrote (31 Aug 2008):
> Woodall free riding uses some irrelevant candidate that
> is ranked first.
>
> Hylland free riding does not rank the favourite candidate.
>
> A third approach to free riding is to rearrange t
many round.
Adjusting the order of all (numerous) candidates would probably be
quite strongly guesswork. It is however quite possible reposition the
second best candidate when the first favourite has low probability of
becoming elected and the second f
On Sep 1, 2008, at 0:49 , Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Juho wrote:
This particular example resembles Hylland free riding (it is an
optimized version of it) but there could be also many other
examples, some of which resemble e.g. Woodall free riding. Only in
some special cases this
On Sep 1, 2008, at 1:10 , Raph Frank wrote:
On Sun, Aug 31, 2008 at 10:18 PM, Juho <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
It may well be the best strategy to rank A below D in the example
above if A
will be elected almost certainly since the voter has an interest to
guarantee that D will be e
On Sep 2, 2008, at 0:58 , Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Juho wrote:
Here's one practical and simple approach to guaranteeing
computational feasibility of some otherwise complex election methods.
The original method might be based e.g. on evaluating all possible
sets of n candidates and
dance on how to vote. But this may not be a practical
strategy.
Juho
On Sep 3, 2008, at 22:46 , Jonathan Lundell wrote:
I haven't been following this thread in great detail, but I do have
a question: what is the distance function actually trying to
measure and minimize? What exac
On Sep 3, 2008, at 18:06 , Jonathan Lundell wrote:
On Sep 3, 2008, at 12:28 AM, Juho wrote:
I hope this speculation provided something useful. And I hope I
got the Meek's method dynamics right.
Meek completely fixes Woodall free riding. That strategy takes
advantage of the fact that
tion methods are sufficient and
will with good probability lead to good enough results. Are there and
counterexamples to this?
Juho
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work, but with priorities
involved too. One can e.g. be a greenish red or a reddish green.
Juho
On Sep 4, 2008, at 1:01 , Stéphane Rouillon wrote:
Hello electorama fans,
regarding that last comment, I invite those interested in non-
geographical district
to consider astrological
On Sep 5, 2008, at 0:52 , Jonathan Lundell wrote:
On Sep 4, 2008, at 2:13 PM, Juho wrote:
I like natural districts, so one approach would be to let people
say and let history decide. The reason why I find "natural"
districts natural in politics is that when people feel like they
On Sep 5, 2008, at 2:13 , Raph Frank wrote:
On Thu, Sep 4, 2008 at 10:13 PM, Juho <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
One simple approach would be to ask the voters directly about the
(physical/mental) distances. The answers could be of e.g.
Village1>Village2>Village3>... There could b
On Sep 5, 2008, at 2:26 , Raph Frank wrote:
On Thu, Sep 4, 2008 at 10:13 PM, Juho <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
The simplest (not necessarily optimal) approach to implement multiple
dimensions is one where you simply elect representatives starting
from the
ones with strongest support (e.g
On Sep 5, 2008, at 4:00 , Stéphane Rouillon wrote:
Hello Juho,
using age, gender or other virtual dimension to build virtual
districts
replaces geographic antagonism by generation antagonism.
Ok, also that may happen. Each society should pick dimensions that
suit them best. (I'm
group differences are also a richness (that we
should try to benefit of instead of trying to eliminate them).
Juho
On Sep 5, 2008, at 11:54 , James Gilmour wrote:
From: Raph Frank > Sent: Friday, September 05, 2008 12:17 AM
On Thu, Sep 4, 2008 at 11:34 PM, James Gilmour
<[EMAIL PROTEC
bably one can find an
80% good solution in one minute). Good performance in value/time
means that general optimization works (and the method can be
considered feasible in practice despite of being theoretically
infeasible).
Juho
On Sep 5, 2008, at 1:28 , Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
ach this goal.
Better keep working and we may see also results some day (not just a
reform but also better representatives and better decisions).
Juho
On Sep 10, 2008, at 0:00 , Terry Bouricius wrote:
Although it may be off-topic for a VOTING method list, I have long
advocated a greate
ntage of strategic voters in each method.
Juho
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
this
point.
I agree. To sum up, may I ask what you think is the key "big-picture
statement" and learnings from this discussion?
Juho
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
steresis
may well not be too problematic.
Juho
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
On Sep 11, 2009, at 1:03 AM, Raph Frank wrote:
On Thu, Sep 10, 2009 at 9:22 PM, Juho wrote:
The hysteresis function may increase the strategic opportunities
since
voters could trust that old representatives will be elected in any
case and
they could try free riding. But in real life small
come from the Smith set.
BR, Juho Laatu
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
On Oct 13, 2009, at 9:01 PM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On Oct 13, 2009, at 1:58 AM, Juho wrote:
Welcome to the list!
thanks.
On Oct 13, 2009, at 7:48 AM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
it is also important to have a deterministic and monotonic measure
of voter support that is
o
achieve the political balance using two-party systems if they so want.)
Juho
On Oct 31, 2009, at 6:17 PM, Kathy Dopp wrote:
Ralph,
I believe that you misunderstood what I was saying below. It is the
relative *number* of candidates who run for office relative to the
number of the voters they rep
gh to make things happen, but
sometimes they need some "help to proceed". (Also media, the
scientific process and books and opinions of respected citizens may be
considered to be parts of the established process.)
Juho
On Oct 31, 2009, at 7:26 PM, Jonathan Lundell wrote:
On Oct
limits. Large number of
candidates offers the voters more power to make the choices (instead
of leaving that to the party officials).
- Large number of candidates and seats also supports better
proportionality / representation of smaller groups.
Juho
P.S. Here is a very short descript
o account also factors like districts and
number of available candidates and parties, cutoffs, restrictions in
nomination etc.
Juho
On Nov 1, 2009, at 9:03 PM, Jonathan Lundell wrote:
On Oct 31, 2009, at 7:29 AM, Kathy Dopp wrote:
3. STV does *not* achieve proportional representation at
On Nov 2, 2009, at 1:53 PM, Raph Frank wrote:
On Mon, Nov 2, 2009 at 6:51 AM, Juho wrote:
If the votes (and proportionality) are counted at national level
that fixes
the (district fragmentation related) problem. STV is at its best in
small
districts with small number of candidates and
On Nov 2, 2009, at 4:50 PM, Jonathan Lundell wrote:
On Nov 1, 2009, at 10:51 PM, Juho wrote:
I wouldn't be as strict as saying that Droop proportionality is an
absolute requirement. I'd be happy to classify all methods that
approximate the principle of x% of votes means x% o
Ok, these examples are sort of second level behind the hottest
political arena. It makes sense not to involve party politics e.g. in
decision making in the schools. Are there maybe counties/cities where
the primary decision making body would have remained non-partisan?
Juho
On Nov 2
On Nov 2, 2009, at 11:30 PM, Raph Frank wrote:
On Mon, Nov 2, 2009 at 8:38 PM, Juho wrote:
On Nov 2, 2009, at 1:53 PM, Raph Frank wrote:
Districts with 7+ seats seem reasonable, and give reasonable
proportionality.
I guess there is some practical limit to how may candidates the
voters
On Nov 2, 2009, at 11:40 PM, Raph Frank wrote:
On Mon, Nov 2, 2009 at 8:56 PM, Juho wrote:
On Nov 2, 2009, at 4:50 PM, Jonathan Lundell wrote:
To harp on California again: we have 53 Congressional districts,
all (of
course) single-seat FPTP. The distribution of Democratic and
Republican
rties are in other districts.
There is however some tendency to end up with two or small number of
parties nation wide.
Juho
On Nov 3, 2009, at 9:22 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Juho wrote:
On Nov 2, 2009, at 4:50 PM, Jonathan Lundell wrote:
Is this acceptable PR? I hope your answ
On Nov 3, 2009, at 3:47 PM, Raph Frank wrote:
On Tue, Nov 3, 2009 at 12:22 PM, Juho wrote:
If one really wants a two-party system and doesn't want voters to
change
that fact then one could ban third parties and accept only two.
That would
solve the spoiler problem :-).
What abou
On Nov 3, 2009, at 5:27 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Juho wrote:
If one really wants a two-party system and doesn't want voters to
change that fact then one could ban third parties and accept only
two. That would solve the spoiler problem :-).
Who is this "one"? Since
to stay
within their "own" parties without the need to abandon them or vote
against them or disagree with them, just slowly changing the opinion
balance within these parties.)
Juho
On Nov 3, 2009, at 7:45 PM, James Gilmour wrote:
Kristofer Munsterhjelm > Sent: Tuesday, Nove
the basic one.
- Unfortunately the model that James Green-Armytage used was not yet
able to handle strategic nominations in Approval. I think cloning has
an impact in Approval (clones may easily harm you).
Juho
Range -> give max to favourite and min to least favourite and scale
groups is one of the "big problems" then
also PR (and typically associated multi winner districts) could be
considered. The improved single winner methods (when used in single
winner districts to form a larger representative body) are one step in
this direction but they will not
rwise comparisons. If there is no such candidate, elect the one
that needs least number of additional votes to win all others. (This
is of course the famous minmax(margins) that I have promoted quite
often.)
Juho
On Nov 10, 2009, at 12:57 PM, Jobst Heitzig wrote:
Dear Matthew,
you wrote:
number of candidates and with a candidate set-up that is
not symmetric or well balanced Approval may well produce biased
results. Methods that are capable of providing richer information
(ranked methods) are likely to provide more balanced input data (and
results).
Juho
On Nov 12, 2009, at 2
thus be some false information in the polls (or in the
discussions between these three voters).
Juho
P.S. The A supporter could also try C>B>A in the poll.
On Nov 14, 2009, at 2:32 PM, Jobst Heitzig wrote:
Dear folks,
it seems there is a stragegy-free Condorcet method after all -
al vote is independent of what one said in the polls.
The basic procedure was thus to collect ranked votes first and only
after that decide the randomish procedure / algorithm input that is
then used to decide which one of the "almost tied leading candidates"
wins.
Juho
On Nov
the candidates (before
the election)?
There might be also richer connections than in a tree (e.g. based on
political views and based on geography). How about allowing the
neighbours to inherit the votes in any direction based on the derived
"cloneness" relationships?
Juho
what the final outcome should be (the
criterion) can be quite simple and intuitive.
(Additional criteria like favouring border lines that follow the
borders of states or rivers etc. can be easily included in the agreed
criterion. Maybe even higher cost of splitting cities etc.)
Juho
On
andom permutations. It would be enough to
define the criterion that can be used to identify the best result and
accept any methods to be used to find it (also to make sure that the
best result will not fall outside of the "accepted calculation rules").
Juho
The ballot order
On Nov 19, 2009, at 5:35 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Juho wrote:
Well, this approach is also complex in the sense that the general
optimization algorithms may be as complex as you want, but the
optimization algorithms are totally independent of the politics and
the basic rules that
On Nov 19, 2009, at 6:55 PM, Raph Frank wrote:
On Thu, Nov 19, 2009 at 4:00 PM, Juho wrote:
My thinking is that it might be easier to agree about the targets
rather
than the whole procedure. The targets can be simpler to define.
Following
Raph Franks model it would be thus enough to say
t
other candidates of the same party).
Juho
On Nov 20, 2009, at 3:37 PM, Brian Olson wrote:
I agree with Juho. Define what a good redistricting result is,
preferably in terms that produce a single valued numeric score, and
then produce maps by whatever means you like and let the best map w
ingle method or class of methods that would be "generally best for
all purposes".
Juho
On Nov 21, 2009, at 11:39 AM, Jobst Heitzig wrote:
Folks,
you probably overlooked that I have already described a variant which
works *completely* without Random Ballot and will definitely e
ecisions and can not be fully controlled by some
central entity (like a party) or by themselves and have only
incomplete and changing poll information available this type of
vulnerability might not cause any problems. Sincere voting could thus
be the main rule in Condorcet elections despite of
How about defining the positions as follows.
A>B>C => A=1, B=2, C=3
A=B>C => A=1.5, B=1.5, C=3
A's position got worse in the second example. B's position got better.
Juho
On Nov 24, 2009, at 6:51 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
It's fairly straightforward to
just saying that in many typical
environments Condorcet methods are indeed "quite LNH" :-).
Juho
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
the second and third group of
voters)
But if we combine these two elections and use ratings then we would
get those combined votes (with ratings) that are listed below. I thus
just derived the votes of the component elections (what they would
have been) from the combined ratings.
Juho
On
On Dec 4, 2009, at 12:12 PM, Raph Frank wrote:
On Fri, Dec 4, 2009 at 12:12 AM, Juho wrote:
27: A=1 B=0 C=0 D=2
26: A=0 B=2 C=1 D=0
25: A=2 B=0 C=1 D=0
22: A=0 B=1 C=0 D=2
A would win the first Condorcet election (or Plurality or whatever
common
single-winner method). C would win the
ty even in the presence of strategies. (maybe one
can say "with certainty" if there are no strategies)
Juho
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
e is the stability. A cycle can be said
to be stable if one can collect sufficient justification that explains
why it is likely to be and stay stable (can be based e.g. on available
polls (that cover a sufficiently long time span) or a theoretical
credible model that explains why people feel this wa
en one step more credible.
Also general loyalty and fighting spirit may make party members quite
loyal to their own candidate even if the candidate would not be an
exact match with the opinions of all of the party supporters.
Juho
If all voters agree about an ideal position (like in the centr
st fix the
tabulation method).
Juho
On Jan 6, 2010, at 7:47 PM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
Terry and i agree on many things and I am convinced we have a common
goal: fair elections that represent the will of the electorate and
do not penalize voters for voting non-strategically. an
corresponding ones developed).
Juho
On Jan 7, 2010, at 12:59 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Juho wrote:
In Burlington at least the arguments for Condorcet should be
straight forward. People are already ok with ranked ballot based
voting. Many of them may feel that in the last election
entation does have a place in the
process. Better to throw the argumentation in although the discussion
and its outcome may not fully follow the intended logic.
Juho
On Jan 7, 2010, at 1:49 AM, Terry Bouricius wrote:
Juho,
Actually, the opposition to IRV in Burlington is predominant
They also said:
> Condorcet-Schultze med 30% kvotering
= Condorcet-Schultze with 30% quotas
I just wonder if that adds something to the basic Schulze method.
Juho
On Jan 7, 2010, at 11:30 PM, Markus Schulze wrote:
Hallo,
the Schulze ranking will be used as defined
in the Wikipe
(There could be also strategic thoughts on what will happen in the
next elections to these candidates and their parties. This kind of
future related considerations could lead to using only values 0 and
100 also for all those candidates whose support level one wants to
influence (although they c
Burlington election is that it probably
managed to capture quite well the sincere opinions of the voters (they
didn't anticipate that some of them would have been better of if they
had not voted sincerely). This makes it easier to estimate how various
methods would behave in this cit
t
heard of any (IRV specific) strategic advices that would have been
given to the voters before the election.
So I believe the votes were quite sincere rankings. In the next IRV
election things might be a bit different.
Juho
--
r b-j r...@audioimagination.com
"
societies from some points of view).
Juho
P.S. One more reason is that Condorcet promoters seem to be lazier
that IRV promoters :-). Condorcet has made some progress in the
academic circles but not yet in politics.
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
nted methods are quite similar from campaigning point
of view, and that with a clear definition of core support we could
better see how well different methods can meet those requirements.
Juho
On Jan 13, 2010, at 4:30 PM, Terry Bouricius wrote:
Juho,
That was a good summary of IRV
On Jan 14, 2010, at 2:13 AM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
On Jan 13, 2010, at 4:49 AM, Juho wrote:
On Jan 13, 2010, at 9:14 AM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
it still is a curiosity to me how, historically, some leaders and
proponents of election reform thunked up the idea to have a ranked-
order
On Jan 16, 2010, at 5:51 AM, Kathy Dopp wrote:
On Jan 14, 2010, at 2:13 AM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
On Jan 13, 2010, at 4:49 AM, Juho wrote:
2) IRV is easier to count manually. Condorcet gets quite tedious
to count manually when the number of candidates and voters goes
up. One can use some
The votes seem to be available.
=> http://data.piratpartiet.se/Data/DisplayInternalPollVotes.aspx?PollId=2
Juho
On Jan 18, 2010, at 7:00 PM, Markus Schulze wrote:
Hallo,
here are the preliminary results
of the primaries:
http://www.piratpartiet.se/nyhe
at strategic voting will not be meaningful in the
planned elections then one should pay attention also to performance
with sincere votes, not only to the resistance against strategies.
Different elections may also have different requirements, so the
question of which one of the methods is best m
On Jan 21, 2010, at 5:33 PM, Jonathan Lundell wrote:
On Jan 21, 2010, at 1:03 AM, Juho wrote:
What is good in all the common Condorcet methods is that their
vulnerabilities to strategies (and their differences in general)
may very well be so small in typical real elections (large, public
winners) could be spoilers. (Typically term spoiler refers to minor
candidates since these discussions typically refer to a two-party set-
up, but the corresponding scientific term might or might not be
limited to minor candidates and/or this particular set-up.)
Juho
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
of this type of argumentation in regular
discussion makes sense. Let's hope people will be more analytical in
this sense in the future.
Juho
On Jan 23, 2010, at 1:36 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Juho wrote:
Many of the criteria would be nice to have. One must however
remember
On Jan 23, 2010, at 1:55 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Juho wrote:
On Jan 22, 2010, at 12:05 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Jonathan Lundell wrote:
In that case it might be a good starting point to define "spoiler",
so we know what we've found when we find it.
What
work so that if there is for
example some room that all consider to be the best then that room
would be given to the most senior voter.
Any chances to work?
Juho
P.S. There could be also preferences like "I want a room next to my
closest colleagues". If one wants to support als
ht be
used as a stick to prompt all voters to come to a unanimous
agreement using an iterative or "bidding" process.
Yes, if the resulting level of randomness is acceptable in the
results. In this case the randomness of the results may be bigger than
in the first proposed approac
On Jan 25, 2010, at 8:49 PM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 05:59 AM 1/25/2010, Juho wrote:
Here's one simple approach.
- all voters rank all the rooms
- use Borda like personal utility values => last room = 0 points,
one but last = 1 point etc. (also other than this kind of linear
ates from
minor parties (with no strong "core support") to win. I'm not saying
that that is a general target, but if someone wants to set that target
then this type of approach could be used. The point is that Condorcet
could also emulate, approximate or even improve some of
On Jan 25, 2010, at 11:07 PM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 03:13 PM 1/25/2010, Juho wrote:
Sure. But equal ranking must be allowed, otherwise noise is
introduced. Borda with equal ranking (and therefore empty ranks,
otherwise equal ranked votes are reduced in strength) is Range. Why
not just
On Jan 26, 2010, at 1:12 AM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 04:05 PM 1/25/2010, Juho wrote:
I reply to myself since I want to present one possible simple method
that combines Condorcet and added weight to first preferences
(something that IRV offers in its own peculiar way).
Let's a
On Jan 26, 2010, at 4:43 AM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 07:22 PM 1/25/2010, Juho wrote:
There are many (working) uses for an approval cutoff in ranked
ballots. But on the other hand they may add complexity and confusion
and not add anything essential. => Careful consideration nee
On Jan 26, 2010, at 6:07 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
Juho wrote (25 Jan 2010):
"I reply to myself since I want to present one possible simple method
that combines Condorcet and added weight to first preferences
(something that IRV offers in its own peculiar way).
Let's add an approval
On Jan 26, 2010, at 8:44 PM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 03:04 AM 1/26/2010, Juho wrote:
On Jan 26, 2010, at 4:43 AM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 07:22 PM 1/25/2010, Juho wrote:
There are many (working) uses for an approval cutoff in ranked
ballots. But on the other hand they may add
On Jan 27, 2010, at 7:02 AM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
At 08:10 PM 1/26/2010, Juho wrote:
The scenario that you described requires some goodwill among the
voters.
That's correct. We seem to imagine that better voting systems will
produce better results even if people continue to
If Range becomes Approval like then you might add also the weaknesses
of Approval in your list.
Juho
On Jan 27, 2010, at 7:58 AM, Jonathan Lundell wrote:
On Jan 26, 2010, at 9:49 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
I understand the limitations of my example. I still think it is a
real weakness for
On Jan 27, 2010, at 8:16 AM, Chris Benham wrote:
Juho wrote (26 Jan 2010):
"It may well be that this method can be characterized as "not fully
Condorcet and Approval strategy added". I'm not quite sure that the
intended idea of "mostly Condorcet with core support rew
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