On Fri, Jan 11, 2013 at 5:19 AM, Michael Ossipoff
email9648...@gmail.com wrote:
In a 3-candidate Condorcet cycle, for any pair of candidates, only one
of those could elect the other by withdrawing. If the other withdrew,
that would elect the 3rd candidate.
Fair enough, I was thinking of IRV
On Mon, Jan 21, 2013 at 5:05 PM, Michael Ossipoff
email9648...@gmail.com wrote:
Elimination would start at the extremes. Transfers would be sent
inward, until the candidates adjacent to the CW would have collected
all of those inward-transferred votes, enough to eliminate the CW.
It seems more
On Wed, Feb 6, 2013 at 9:47 AM, Peter Zbornik pzbor...@gmail.com wrote:
James, Jonathan,
I need that the quoted-in people are quoted-in in such a way, that the
proportionality of the election is not significantly disturbed.
James Gilmour has the right idea.
Elect 5 seats, but don't eliminate
On Thu, Feb 7, 2013 at 8:24 PM, Peter Zbornik pzbor...@gmail.com wrote:
Here is an example to illustrate the problem:
Coalition 1: 32: w1w4w3m3
Coalition 2: 33: w1w3w4m4
Coalition 3: 35: w2w5m1m2
Thus, the right distribution, intuitively is:
4th seat - m3
5th seat - w5
Is this a
What about this rule, if simplicity is required.
1) Run a standard PR-STV election.
2) If the result violates the criterion
- permanently eliminate the weakest candidate of the over-represented
gender and repeat
The first candidate to be eliminated is weakest and the first
candidate to be
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