The difference between Mr. Speer version and yours,
is your interpretation of this:
>"If a candidate is removed from the ballot, and people's preferences remain
>the same - they do not strategically change their votes - then the
>winner will still win."
He supposes removing some candidate would n
At 6:39 PM -0400 7/14/03, Rob Speer wrote:
Approval voting is independent from irrelevant alternatives. If a
candidate is removed from the ballot, and people's preferences remain
the same - they do not strategically change their votes - then the
winner will still win.
Borrowing the defintion of IIA
On Mon, 14 Jul 2003, Rob Speer wrote:
> I will restate my question. I didn't know that people had such radically
> different ideas of Arrow's Theorem.
>
> I have seen Arrow's theorem defined with the following 4 criteria:
>
> 1. Preferential voting: Voters are allowed to express preference orders.
> The only situations when PR is not appropriate is when PR is not
> possible. In those instances ( for a single position) we are left with
> trying to use the least bad single seat method.
Here you say (and I agree) that proportionality is not a concern when
discussing offices that, by their na
Rob Speer said:
> On Mon, Jul 14, 2003 at 04:06:19PM -0400, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>> Arrow's Dictator principle only means that (if all other conditions
>> are satisfied) there is one (subset of) voter(s) who determine the
>> outcome of an election involving 3 or more choices. Approval voting
On Mon, Jul 14, 2003 at 06:21:34PM -0400, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> Eric Gore wrote:
>> What about situations where PR is not appropriate?
>
> The only situations when PR is not appropriate is when PR is not possible. In
> those instances ( for a single position) we are left with trying to use t
I will restate my question. I didn't know that people had such radically
different ideas of Arrow's Theorem.
I have seen Arrow's theorem defined with the following 4 criteria:
1. Preferential voting: Voters are allowed to express preference orders.
2. Non-dictatorship: There does not exist a sing
On Mon, Jul 14, 2003 at 04:06:19PM -0400, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> Arrow's Dictator principle only means that (if all other conditions are
> satisfied) there is one (subset of) voter(s) who determine the outcome of an
> election involving 3 or more choices. Approval voting has this attribute, i
Adam Tarr wrote:
"Doesn't that suggest that arguing that Condorcet is bad because it fails to produce proportionality, is sort of missing the point?"
No not exactly, Plurality and IRV in single seats can give a party 70 % of the seats for 35- 40% of the vote. This is a bad thing.
Condorcet in
Donald Davison wrote (in part):
> 7/14/03 - Single-Seat Method in a Multi-Seat Method:
>
> Greetings Michael and James,
>
> Michael you wrote:
> >and can be used for multi- winner elections (just take the
> >top N candidates in the ranking rather than just the top one).
>
> And James you wrote:
On Mon, Jul 14, 2003 at 03:13:36PM -0400, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> In a message dated 7/14/03 2:05:14 PM Central Daylight Time, [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> writes:
>
> > believe that Approval satisfies non-dictatorship (duh), Pareto
> > optimality (if you get 100% of the vote, then of course you win),
7/14/03 - Single-Seat Method in a Multi-Seat Method:
Greetings Michael and James,
Michael you wrote:
>and can be used for multi- winner elections (just take the
>top N candidates in the ranking rather than just the top one).
And James you wrote:
Maybe it CAN be used for this purpose, but it neve
At 2:57 PM -0400 7/14/03, Rob Speer wrote:
But the fact remains that it [Approval] seems to be immune to Arrow's
theorem because it is not preferential.
No, it is not immune. It is just another system that fails to meet
all of the criteria that Arrow set forth.
The preference order that Approval
At 1:17 PM -0500 7/14/03, Adam Haas Tarr wrote:
So, given only some very reasonable assumptions about the nature of voter
preferences and election methods, I have demonstrated why no reasonable
method can be expected to pass IIA. This is why I think Arrow's theorem,
while perhaps elegant, is of li
On Mon, Jul 14, 2003 at 01:17:05PM -0500, Adam Haas Tarr wrote:
> Wow, Eric went to the source and got the answer. Good work.
>
> So, Arrow's original approach to the theorem could be summed up like this:
>
> 1) monotonicity + IIA => Pareto Efficiency.
>
> 2) IIA + Pareto Efficiency => Dictator
At 2003-07-14 09:22 -0700 Monday, Rob LeGrand wrote:
>Craig Carey wrote:
>> Votes Percentage
>>+--+ -
>>| A 50,000,001 199,999,999 | 20.004 49.9975
>>| BA49,999
Wow, Eric went to the source and got the answer. Good work.
So, Arrow's original approach to the theorem could be summed up like this:
1) monotonicity + IIA => Pareto Efficiency.
2) IIA + Pareto Efficiency => Dictatorship
And you could skip the first step if you like. Alex's interpretation
(
At 10:20 AM -0400 7/14/03, Eric Gorr wrote:
At 10:18 PM -0700 7/13/03, Alex Small wrote:
In my opinion, Arrow's theorem is more impressive when you have as few
assumptions as possible. When the list of incompatible assumptions is
large, somebody can say "Well, duh! If you pile on a whole bunch of
Craig Carey wrote:
> Votes Percentage
>+--+ -
>| A 50,000,001 199,999,999 | 20.004 49.9975
>| BA49,999,99950,000,001 | 19.996 12.5025
>| CB
Below, a reply to Mr Venkze:
Ballot papers inside of ballot papers; Approval vs monotonicity
--
At 2003-07-13 19:14 +0100 Sunday, James Gilmour wrote:
...
>> What are the flaws of STV?
>
>Like several other systems, i
At 10:18 PM -0700 7/13/03, Alex Small wrote:
In my opinion, Arrow's theorem is more impressive when you have as few
assumptions as possible. When the list of incompatible assumptions is
large, somebody can say "Well, duh! If you pile on a whole bunch of
assumptions you're likely to make the task
Mr Keshet of the wikipedia.org website gave grounds saying he could not unstand
the lot and dashed off.
I have produced something that can be put into advocacy material.
Here I show that the Alternative Vote will almost negate (i.e. wrongly lose)
the votes of 105 million Americans (after the nu
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