I have a decent idea for a refinement, which might permit CR to boil down
to Approval ballots filled out per the Better-Than-Expectation strategy.
You could also do the Maximum Power strategy.
Suppose there are two factions that vote roughly as follows:
50%: A 10, others 0
50%: B 10, C 10, others
James G-A,
Further on the subject of my proposal to modify STV-PR by , after
transfering supluses, eliminating the Condorcet loser among those votes
and fractions of votes not tied up in quotas: I am afraid I have
discovered that this method fails FBC (Favourite Betrayal Criterion).
To demonst
Forest,
I implemented the new method (picking the least viable rank and merging it with
the less viable neighbor) and did some trials.
First, I should say that the Condorcet cycle-breaker I have implemented is:
"Successively drop the weakest defeats (as measured by WV) until a Smith set
member is
Re: [EM] Hare and Droop, d'Hondt and Sainte-Lague
Kevin, you wrote:
>I started reading about methods of proportional seat allocation.
>I have a couple of questions...
>
>First, what is IRV's relation to Hare (quota of (votes/seats))?
Donald here: There is no relationship. Irving is a single seat
