RE: [EM] Does Droop give the same results as Hare?

2003-08-08 Thread James Gilmour
Donald wrote (in part): > Second: Your example tells us that you are a man of many > hats. Today you are wearing your `Political Party' hat. > Most days you wear your `Independent Candidate' hat (to show > that you are a champion of the independent candidate). This analysis might suit Dona

Re: [EM] 2nd Query for Approval advocates

2003-08-08 Thread Stephane Rouillon
M. Hodges, "John B. Hodges" a écrit : > Yesterday I asked about "Generalized Bucklin"/MCA: Voters submit > ranked ballots, which may include ties, and need not list all > candidates. First-choice votes are tallied; if any candidates get > votes from a majority (more than 50%) of the voters, the

Re: [EM] IRV vs. plurality

2003-08-08 Thread Adam Tarr
At the risk of repeating myself, my argument against Condorcet can be summarised as follows: I do not support Condorcet because I believe that in practice, regardless of the theoretical and conceptual advantages it may possess, it would be too favourable towards parties who succeed in positioning

[EM] Condorcet 2 - The Sequel ( the same people say the same things)

2003-08-08 Thread Dgamble997
Why the unrealistic example is unrealistic: 40A 35C>B 30B This example is not realistic because it is extremely unlikely that all the supporters of one party would express a second preference whilst none of the supporters of the two other parties would. Why this example is not  that unrealistic

[EM] PostPostscript:2nd Query for Approval advocates

2003-08-08 Thread John B. Hodges
PostPostscript: Technical nicety. On each round of balloting for the multiseat-Bucklin procedure, the Droop quotas are calculated AFTER that round's ballots are tallied and added to any votes carrying over from previous rounds. DQ = (#votes)/(#seats+1). I suspect this procedure is going to over

Re: [EM] Naive random UWA, timeshare, etc.

2003-08-08 Thread Forest Simmons
Here's an idea for turning random ballot into a deterministic method that is equivalent for all practical purposes, but allows checking of the result by independent parties: Suppose that there are three candidates and that their respective "random shares" are proportional to 3:7:9, respectively,

Re: [SPAM: #] [EM] Approval Strategy

2003-08-08 Thread Alex Small
Neal Finne said: > I'd be reluctant to use any electoral system that requires voters to > vote strategically. Still, within those systems, approval is a huge > improvement over plurality or IRV. There is a theorem (named after its discoverers, Gibbard and Satterthwaite) which states that no ranked

[EM] 2nd Query for Approval advocates

2003-08-08 Thread John B. Hodges
Yesterday I asked about "Generalized Bucklin"/MCA: Voters submit ranked ballots, which may include ties, and need not list all candidates. First-choice votes are tallied; if any candidates get votes from a majority (more than 50%) of the voters, the one with the largest majority wins. If none