Dave, you write
>Just looking at the first example:
> It starts with 44: B>A - they consider A to be better than C, and A
>wins - GREAT!
> Then they switch to 44: B>C - they claim to prefer C over A, and C
>wins - ALSO GREAT!
No, when they switch to B>C, B wins, not C, although C migh
On Sun, 17 Aug 2003 18:57:11 -0400 Eric Gorr wrote:
At 5:13 PM -0400 8/17/03, James Green-Armytage wrote:
The outcome is unpredictable. It is quite possible that C will be elected,
despite the fact that he so clearly does not deserve to win. This is not a
pleasant scenario at all from the point o
I am playing catchup, raher than resoponding especially to Alex.
I am seeing statements in this thread that are NOT what I expected!
On Sun, 17 Aug 2003 15:34:46 -0700 (PDT) Alex Small wrote:
Adam Tarr said:
Well, since Condorcet is (to the best of my knowledge) never used in
public elections a
At 5:13 PM -0400 8/17/03, James Green-Armytage wrote:
The outcome is unpredictable. It is quite possible that C will be elected,
despite the fact that he so clearly does not deserve to win. This is not a
pleasant scenario at all from the point of view of democracy, utility,
majority rule, public tr
Adam Tarr said:
>
>>Well, since Condorcet is (to the best of my knowledge) never used in
>> public elections and rarely used in private groups, I don't know
>> whether the 0.5 votes each is a standard convention or not. It
>> wouldn't change the margins, so it would be applicable to margins
>> met
Dear election methods fans,
There is a fellow named Burt Monroe who has a theory that he calls "turkey
raising." I have read a sort of paper of his on the subject, called
"Raising Turkeys: An Extension and Devastating Application of
Myerson-Weber Voting Equilibrium." Looking back into the archive
At 1:43 PM -0500 8/17/03, Adam Tarr wrote:
Well, since Condorcet is (to the best of my knowledge) never used in
public elections and rarely used in private groups, I don't know whether
the 0.5 votes each is a standard convention or not. It wouldn't change
the margins, so it would be applicable to
Dear Rob,
you wrote (17 Aug 2003):
> I've encountered people who have heard of Condorcet but are scared off
> because they think the voter has to vote explicitly in each pairwise
> contest. Is this just misinterpretation, or deliberate FUD by IRV
> supporters?
>From time to time, there are scient
Well, since Condorcet is (to the best of my knowledge) never used in
public elections and rarely used in private groups, I don't know whether
the 0.5 votes each is a standard convention or not. It wouldn't change
the margins, so it would be applicable to margins methods. Certainly it
would be ne
Rob Speer wrote:
Alex Small wrote:
> Dave Ketchum said:
> > 9045? I see counts for A>B and B>A as separate tallies.
>
> Good point. I forgot about equal rankings necessitating such separate
> tallies.
This part confuses me. I assume this is the same as counting an equal
ranking as "half a vote f
Rob Speer said:
> This part confuses me. I assume this is the same as counting an equal
> ranking as "half a vote for each", which has come up a lot, when I
> always thought of an equal ranking as simply not changing anything
> between the two candidates.
>
> Since most Condorcet methods I'm famili
On Sun, Aug 17, 2003 at 12:11:42AM -0700, Alex Small wrote:
> Dave Ketchum said:
> > 9045? I see counts for A>B and B>A as separate tallies.
>
> Good point. I forgot about equal rankings necessitating such separate
> tallies.
This part confuses me. I assume this is the same as counting an equal
Dave Ketchum said:
> 9045? I see counts for A>B and B>A as separate tallies.
Good point. I forgot about equal rankings necessitating such separate
tallies.
More important is that Donald tried to imply the ballot would have
separate slots for the 9,045 pairwise contests, in which case the ballot
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