I have recently spotted another blunder in the presentation of my
suggested new voting method. I wrote:
A recent example from James Green-Armytage (Sun. 17-8-03).
46: ABC
44: BCA
05: CAB
05: CBA
According to James, his 44 BCA voters are insincerely order-reversing
(trying a Burial
At 3:05 AM +0930 8/23/03, Chris Benham wrote:
In reference to this example:
31: BAECD
23: CBAED
25: DACEB
11: DCBAE
10: EACBD
100 voters, the Smith set is ABC.
On Thursday,August 21, 2003 Eric Gorr wrote:
This example contains a simple cycle between ABC. It is clear that
DE are not preferred
The complaints against STV, as I recall, boiled down to just like
IRV, STV will sometimes eliminate the wrong candidate. It is not
monotonic, so sometimes you get spoiler effects and perverse
incentives.
The orphan method is one step more complicated than IRV/STV, but it
is still a simple method.
Subject: Re: [EM] Cheering for simplicity/Orphan
From: Joe Mason
On Thu, Aug 21, 2003 at 10:41:39PM -0500, Adam Haas Tarr wrote:
2) Since it is a Condorcet-compliant method, it shares all the
weaknesses that
all Condorcet methods have in the eyes of the IRV advocates (i.e. the weak
center
John B. Hodges wrote:
CPO-STV is an awesome multiseat method, conceptually. I'm wondering
if there is a computationally efficient way of arriving at the same
ideal ensemble. My For Dummies guess is that the ideal ensemble
will never include a Condorcet loser and will always include a
John B. Hodges wrote:
Subject: Re: [EM] Cheering for simplicity/Orphan
From: Joe Mason
On Thu, Aug 21, 2003 at 10:41:39PM -0500, Adam Haas Tarr wrote:
2) Since it is a Condorcet-compliant method, it shares all the
weaknesses that
all Condorcet methods have in the eyes of the IRV advocates
