Kevin,
Previously I wrote:
CB:I recently considered this method (and similar non-elimination versions of IRV), but
> rejected it because it fails this example:
>
> 51:A>B>C
> 50:B>A>C
> 100:C
> 52:D>E>C
> 49:E>D>C
> 302 votes.
>
> The CW (and Plurality winner) is C. IRV elects E. "RWE" elec
Kevin,
Previously, I wrote:
CB:In step 1, why did you specify that voters only rank the candidates "they would
be willing to support"? What the hell is the "approval cutoff" for? Pardon my tone,
but I have no sympathy for the stupid tendency to want to confuse ranking with rating.
To which yo
Chris,
Actually I'm wondering if you perhaps mismatched these votes with other results.
You said IRV picks E, but E is the first candidate eliminated!
I don't think IRV is decisive in this scenario.
> > CB:I recently considered this method (and similar non-elimination versions of
> > IRV), but
Chris,
--- Chris Benham <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> 1. The voter ranks candidates. (As in Bucklin, voters should decide where to
> stop ranking.)
> 2. Initially count first-place rankings only.
> 3. While no one has votes from a majority (of ALL voters), AND non-eliminated
> candidates exi
--- [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > Bart Ingles wrote in
part:
http://search.yahoo.com.au - Yahoo! Search
- Looking for more? Try the new Yahoo! Search>The only large-scale demonstration of IRV we have is Australia's lower
>>house, where district elections are virtually all bipartisan (there are
>>ap
At 6:22 PM -0400 9/9/03, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
In a message dated 9/9/03 4:57:01 PM Central Daylight Time,
[EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
>Again, there was no contest between B &C.
Yes, there was.
The contest took place in the individual voter rankings.
And 70 of the 105 voters thought B shou
In a message dated 9/9/03 4:57:01 PM Central Daylight Time, [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
>Again, there was no contest between B &C.
Yes, there was.
The contest took place in the individual voter rankings.
And 70 of the 105 voters thought B shouldn't win.
At 5:16 PM -0400 9/9/03, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
In a message dated 9/9/03 3:57:40 PM Central Daylight Time,
[EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
B *IS* preferred by a majority over both A & C
Only in pairwise compaisons between B<>A, and B<>C. But that wasn't
the election.
In the contest between B & A,
In a message dated 9/9/03 3:57:40 PM Central Daylight Time, [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
>B *IS* preferred by a majority over both A & C
Only in pairwise compaisons between B<>A, and B<>C. But that wasn't the election.
>In the contest between B & A, only 85 people choose to participate.
>Of those 8
At 12:42 AM -0700 9/1/03, Bart Ingles wrote:
Eric Gorr wrote:
At 11:47 AM -0700 8/31/03, Bart Ingles wrote:
>You could say that "B is obviously preferred by *majorities* of people
>over every other option, but even so the "majorities" are merely
>incidental. B would be the CW without them:
>
Dear List Members
This is not a contribution to the current threads, but I thought someone
might be able to help.
Does anyone know how the New Zealand voters who used it reacted to STV?
In particular, were there any complaints about lack of transparency in
the computer counting system?
Simon Ga
I apologize for the delay in my next installment on this topic, but I want
to work out some good examples before I go too much further abstractly.
Meanwhile, if you want something to whet your appetite along these lines
look up the topic "tensor voting" on google.com
One site it will cite is
htt
Thanks for the insights, Rob.
On Sat, 6 Sep 2003, Rob LeGrand wrote:
> Forest wrote:
> > What do you think of the Candidate Proxy / Approval hybrid that I
> > suggested a few months ago?
> >
> > Voters fill out regular approval style ballots. If a voter makes only one
> > mark on the ballot, then
Very interesting!
Simulations of these dynamical systems could easily include the candidate
popularity factor.
Would typical initial conditions lead to equilibium solutions? Would they
cycle? Or would they be chaotic?
Simulations can answer many such questions if the analytical approach
below ge
Kevin,
On Mon. Sep.8, you wrote:
"Back in 1998 or so there was a method known as "Runoff Without Elimination"
or "RWE." I think it may have been devised by Donald.
I'm not sure if this is a faithful reproduction of the rules, but I have
programmed this:
1. The voter ranks candidates. (As in Buck
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