Simon Gazeley wrote:
>Dear List Members
>This is not a contribution to the current threads, but I thought someone
>might be able to help.
>Does anyone know how the New Zealand voters who used it reacted to STV?
>In particular, were there any complaints about lack of transparency in
>the computer
Donald wrote in response to the example:
> 49 A>B
> 3B
> 48 C>B
>For B to win in this situation she/he must have a minimum utility of 0.92 to A>B >voters and a minimum utility of 0.96 to C>B voters. To win B has to be highly liked >(approved?) by everybody.
> 49 A1.00 > B0.92
> 3 B1.00
> 48 C
1.CR ballots, voters give each candidate a score out of 100 ( or any
other round number that is much greater than the number of candidates.)
2. Inferring the rankings from the ratings, elect the CW is there is
one. If not, then eliminate the non-members of the Smith set.
3.Those ballots which
Kevin,
I have a couple of new ideas concerning "Approval Elimination Runoff".
The first concerns how to deal with multiple majorities.
I now think that if at any stage there are rival majorities, then there
should a runoff between the biggest majority candidate and the most
approved majority
On Sat, 13 Sep 2003, [iso-8859-1] Kevin Venzke wrote:
> What your Max Power method does in the three-candidate, weak centrist
> scenario is a perfect example of this: The low-utility centrist will be embraced
> as soon as a major faction "learns" they can't win.
>
Thanks for this comment. I'm go
On Sat, 13 Sep 2003, [iso-8859-1] Kevin Venzke wrote:
... [skipping past many great insights to this proposal] ...
>
> When there are cycles, I think there's necessarily a game of chicken going
> on among the voters. I think an approval measurement is the best way to
> resolve the game, forcin
On Sat, 6 Sep 2003, Joe Mason wrote:
> On Sat, Sep 06, 2003 at 04:40:58PM -0700, Rob LeGrand wrote:
> > I like it. My only worry is that the candidates themselves might be far
> > less willing to compromise than the voters. In the California
> > gubernatorial "race", Bill Simon pulled out to avo
So this turns out to be a many body problem. Some methods (if not
results) from statistical mechanics might apply here.
Forest
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
I would just like to point out that a method I posted on Fri.Aug.
22, which for the time being I shall dub "Improved Generalised
Bucklin" ( the full "2-way" version), succeeds in many of the examples
(given in the "Query for one and all" thread)
of plain (Generalised) Bucklin failing
Donald,
--- Donald Davison <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit : >
> David and EM list,
>
> David, you wrote: "Take the simplified example:
>
> 49 A>B
> 3B
> 48 C>B
>
> For B to win in this situation she/he must have a minimum utility of 0.92 to
> A>B voters and a minimum utility of 0.96 to C>B voter
Forest,
--- Forest Simmons <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> Suppose you were given a set of voted CR ballots, perhaps with
> supplemental information such as a tentative approval cutoff. What rule
> would you use to adjust the approval cutoff by taking into account the
> popularity of the variou
David and EM list,
David, you wrote: "Take the simplified example:
49 A>B
3B
48 C>B
For B to win in this situation she/he must have a minimum utility of 0.92 to
A>B voters and a minimum utility of 0.96 to C>B voters. To win B has to be
highly liked (approved?) by everybody."
Donald here: If
On Sat, Sep 06, 2003 at 04:40:58PM -0700, Rob LeGrand wrote:
> I like it. My only worry is that the candidates themselves might be far
> less willing to compromise than the voters. In the California
> gubernatorial "race", Bill Simon pulled out to avoid drawing votes away
> from Schwarzenegger, b
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