Re: [EM] Arrow's Theorem - The Return (again)

Eric Gorr said: > I recently purchased a copy of Arrow's book 'Social Choice and > Individual Values' Second Edition (ISBN: 0300013647). > > The last time this topic came up, it was argued that Arrow's Theorem > only involved strict preferences, based on the document found at: Eric- I freely conc

[EM] old school MCA issue

Here are some messages that might be of interest: Forest proposes the method (MCA): http://groups.yahoo.com/group/election-methods-list/message/9571 Alex proposes that any number of favorites be permissible: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/election-methods-list/message/9582 Forest agrees but express

[EM] Arrow's Theorem - The Return (again)

I recently purchased a copy of Arrow's book 'Social Choice and Individual Values' Second Edition (ISBN: 0300013647). The last time this topic came up, it was argued that Arrow's Theorem only involved strict preferences, based on the document found at: http://faculty-web.at.northwestern.edu/ec

Re: [EM] Gervase, may I correct you?

> Date: Fri, 17 Oct 2003 05:37:48 -0400 > From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Donald Davison) > Subject: [EM] Gervase, may I correct you? > Back in August, I ranked Irving number one, not number ten (number one > being the best). > But, you got something right when you said that I ranked Approval number > e

Re: [EM] Weak FBC and equal-ranking-allowed IRV

Chris, --- Chris Benham <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit : > Kevin, > I was surprised to see you recently write (Fri.Oct.17) > > "The point of allowing equal ranking in IRV, is to make it always safe to vote > without order reversal." > > because equal-ranking-allowed whole votes IRV doesn't reall

Re: [EM] whipping-boy Borda

David Gamble wrote: > Year 1 > > An election is held using Borda for a single seat. There are two > candidates A and B. The voters give the following rankings: > > 12 A > 40 A>B > 30 B>A > 18 B > > A obtains 52 points (52x1 + 30x0), B obtains 48 points (48x1 + > 40x0). A wins. > > Year 2 > > This