David GLAUDE wrote:
>
> * Do you know of any other extremist party using that argument and
> making reference to Kenneth Arrow?
I don't know if I'd call the CVD an extremist party, but they're not
above the same rationalization:
http://www.fairvote.org/pr/perfectsystem.htm
The next-to-last pa
Donald Davison wrote:
c. bounce all posts, with explanation "please join the list to post"
I recently received this typical message (not from this list):
Your mail to 'XXX mailing-list name XXX' with the subject
XXX My subject XXX
Is being held until the list moderator can review it for
--- In [EMAIL PROTECTED], David GLAUDE
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> [[Do you know that a multi-cultural society cannot be democratic?
> The Nobel Prize Kenneth Arrow mathematically showed, in 1952, that
there
> was no possible democracy via a voting system (theorem of
> impossibility), except if
I vote:
c. bounce all posts, with explanation "please join the list to post"
Donald,
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Dear David,
you wrote (21 Nov 2003):
> [[Do you know that a multi-cultural society cannot be democratic?
> The Nobel Prize Kenneth Arrow mathematically showed, in 1952, that
> there was no possible democracy via a voting system (theorem of
> impossibility), except if the voters share the same cult
I would like to thank you all for your help.
I was not sure at all if you could help and if this was Out of Topic or
not... I feel like this was the one and only valuable place to ask this
kind of question.
Even if we might never agree on e-voting and I might continue to fight
any attempt to i
David wrote:
> Thanks for the information. So am I right in thinking that strategy A
> gets to the Condorcet winner by a process of iteration. In response to a
> series of Approval polls the voters alter their choices and end up voting
> in such a way that they elect the Condorcet winner. Or is it
> Date: Fri, 21 Nov 2003 01:42:05 +0100
> From: David GLAUDE <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Subject: [EM] [OT] Kenneth Arrow theory... anyone?
> [[Do you know that a multi-cultural society cannot be democratic?
> The Nobel Prize Kenneth Arrow mathematically showed, in 1952, that there
> was no possible dem
> From: "Joe Weinstein" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Date: Thu, 20 Nov 2003 14:51:13 -0800
> Subject: [EM] Batch of old mail
> Reject any non-list-member message, but insofar possible in your
> rejection response tell the sender:
>
> (1) 'You must join the list in order to post to it.'
> (2) Ho
Hallo,
in March 2003, Steve Eppley proposed a new tie-breaking strategy
for Ranked Pairs. (Actually, as far as I remember correctly, this
tie-breaking strategy has already been proposed in Sep. 2001 by
Rob LeGrand to the Ranked Pairs mailing list.)
Suppose that "pos[i]" is the position of candida
Dear Sampa,
The exact result is that when there are n alternatives there are at most
2^(n-1) ballots which can form a single-peaked set, and the proof is a
geometric argument using mathematical induction based on the number of
ways to draw the single-peaked schedules in an nxn array of lattice
On 2003-11-21, Alex Small uttered:
>Is this "single-peakedness" the same as saying all voters fall on a 1D
>ideological spectrum?
Basically yes.
>e.g. if all voters and candidates fit on the left-right spectrum, then all
>voters will have one of these preferences:
>
>Left>Middle>Right
>Right>Mid
On 2003-11-21, Joseph Malkevitch uttered:
>If one can order the alternatives being voted on (candidates) on a linear
>scale so that all of the alternatives are "single peaked" (using ordinal
>ranking ballots) then if there are an odd number of voters the Condorcet
>method will always choose a winn
I did not explain what I wanted very clearly in my haste. Single-peakedness is
a property of a collection of ballots with respect to an ordering of the
alternatives. (one plots the height of the alternative on the ballot against
the linear ordering getting a line or broken line segments what are si
Rob LeGrand wrote in response to my post:
>The short answer is that you're allowing the voters to adjust their votes
>only once. With repeated adjustments, the voters would be able to find the
>equilibrium
Thanks for the information. So am I right in thinking that strategy A gets to the Condo
Is this "single-peakedness" the same as saying all voters fall on a 1D
ideological spectrum?
e.g. if all voters and candidates fit on the left-right spectrum, then all
voters will have one of these preferences:
Left>Middle>Right
Right>Middle>Left
Middle>Left>Right
Middle>Right>Left
But if issue
If one can order the alternatives being voted on (candidates) on a linear
scale so that all of the alternatives are "single peaked" (using ordinal
ranking ballots) then if there are an odd number of voters the Condorcet
method will always choose a winner. (This result is due to Duncan Black.)
Being
On 2003-11-21, David GLAUDE uttered:
>[[Do you know that a multi-cultural society cannot be democratic? The
>Nobel Prize Kenneth Arrow mathematically showed, in 1952, that there was
>no possible democracy via a voting system (theorem of impossibility),
>except if the voters share the same culture
Rob Lanphier wrote:
Obviously answer to the problem is to really moderate the list... not
every 20 days.
Sifting through spam in a limited webform interface is a task I really
don't look forward to. So, unfortunately, it may be 20 days between
times that I do this.
Maybe that is the problem, ha
It looks like (c) is the most popular option, so that's what I'll be
implementing, short of any further discussion/debate on the list.
I'd like to respond to David's mail below:
David GLAUDE wrote:
Obviously answer to the problem is to really moderate the list... not
every 20 days.
Sifting thr
20 matches
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