It was just pointed out that I used the term "cardinal utilities", where
I should have used either "cardinal preferences" or "utilities".
Bart
Bart Ingles wrote:
>
> > [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> >
> > > In strategic voting whether A>B voters approve A or A and B
> > > depends on how the voters
> Basically the idea was to attempt to generate a realistic set
> of votes (one where voters vote principally but not entirely
> on a single ( left-right ) dimension) and then calculate the
> results under a variety of different methods to see how they
> differ.
David, thanks for specifying s
> [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
> > In strategic voting whether A>B voters approve A or A and B
> > depends on how the voters respond to the information in an opinion
> > poll using strategy A.
One other minor point: strategic voting involving opinion polls depends
on BOTH strategic information abo
I can only think of a few ways to derive the required information from
ballots (I don't think I even want to get into aggregation methods
here):
1) allow the voters to assign a rating to each candidate, so that the
B+C will be chosen if their combined score is higher than A, for
example. This mi
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
> Bart Ingles wrote:
>
> >There is no way to accurately determine approval voting results using
> >this input format. About the best you can do is to assume that for
> the
> >A>B voters, half approve both A and B, and the other half approve
> only
> >A. This would mak
Bart Ingles wrote:
>There is no way to accurately determine approval voting results using
>this input format. About the best you can do is to assume that for the
>A>B voters, half approve both A and B, and the other half approve only
>A. This would make approval voting equivalent to Borda, at leas
James Gilmour wrote:
>David Gamble wrote:
>> I would like volunteers to test this model and give their
>> comments on it. If you would like a copy of the model to test
>No test is possible because you have not specified the criteria against which
>you wish to test the systems.
Basically the ide
A theoretical, though impractical way to handle this would be as follows:
Have independent ballot-choices for place 1, place 2, etc. which each allow
the ranking of all candidates. The voter may choose to rank A>B>C>D... in
every position, in which case their "vote" degenerates into some variation
Condorcet methods like beatpath winner can be used to obtain a ranking
of the candidates but they don't seem to be good for elections in which
the goal is proportional representation. I'm curious whether people
know about generalizations of beatpath winner that make sense for this
purpose.
There
There is no way to accurately determine approval voting results using
this input format. About the best you can do is to assume that for the
A>B voters, half approve both A and B, and the other half approve only
A. This would make approval voting equivalent to Borda, at least where
fully ranked
On Sunday Dec.28, 2003, I wrote:
"Mono-add-top" is a Woodall criterion which says that adding ballots that all give
first-preference to X must not harm X. It is met by IRV and Margins, but not by WV.
On the same date Mike Ossipoff replied:
"I'm not
David Gamble wrote:
> I would like volunteers to test this model and give their
> comments on it. If you would like a copy of the model to test
No test is possible because you have not specified the criteria against which you wish
to test the
systems
If your criterion is proportionality of
Hello List
I've recently been working on a spreadsheet model to compare various different electoral methods. What it does is generate, for a 3 party election, sets of votes for 50 single member districts, based on an inputted set of preferences amongst the electorate and then calculate the results
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