Bart Ingles wrote:
> The main reason is that, while we have no information about the voters'
> utilities for each candidate, the voters themselves surely would.
>
MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
> They don't. That's the assumption. All I said was that, if a voter doesn't
> have opinions about rating the c
Stephane wrote
>> I keep thinking that one of the chamber should use non-geographical districts.
>> For an example using 40 seats you could use the day and month of birth. So for
>> this chamber, no gerrymanderring, no dealing for votes, no seat reserved for
>> candidates friends of the party chi
> > > Interesting question. I agree with your answer except for
> > > the size of the districts. According to Duverger, a district
> > > size of 10 supports 11 parties.
> >
> > What does this statement mean? I am not aware that there is any
> > direct relationship between district magnitude
Stephane wrote
> Sincerely,
> I believe any geographic linkage is source of clientelism
> (favourism) between elected officials and their electorate.
> I keep thinking that one of the chamber should use
> non-geographical districts.
> For an example using 40 seats you could use the day and month
A couple of points:
Bart Ingles wrote:
>[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>>
>> Bart Ingles wrote:
>>
>> >But truncation is equivalent to equal last-choice preference for all of
>> >the methods listed below.
>>
>> Yes, it is equivalent but expressing an equal preference for two or
>> more candidates is
Sincerely,
I believe any geographic linkage is source of clientelism (favourism)
between elected officials and their electorate.
I keep thinking that one of the chamber should use non-geographical districts.
For an example using 40 seats you could use the day and month of birth.
Seat number
MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote :
(David Gamble I think) continued:
Thus in a four-way race, for a block of voters with identical preference
orders, I would assume that 1/3 approve of three candidates, 1/3 approve
two candidates, and the final 1/3 bullet vote. I believe this would
give
results identical to
MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote :
(David Gamble I think) continued:
Thus in a four-way race, for a block of voters with identical preference
orders, I would assume that 1/3 approve of three candidates, 1/3 approve
two candidates, and the final 1/3 bullet vote. I believe this would
give
results identical to
Anyone with his latest email adress?
Host condorcet.org is not responding.
The following recipients did not receive this message:
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-
Thanks,
Steph
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Jeffrey ONeill said:
> Hi Alex,
>
> Interesting question. I agree with your answer except for the size of
> the districts. According to Duverger, a district size of 10 supports 11
> parties. If each party runs a full slate, then there would be 110
> candidates. I would prefer a district size of
I've just released version 0.2 of pSTV. There have been many changes since the
previous version and this release is fully functional with no known bugs (yet).
The most significant change is that ERS97 rules are fully implemented and the
results have been compared extensively with eSTV.
Methods a
Rob Speer said:
> On Mon, Jan 05, 2004 at 04:07:08PM +, MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
>>
>> I believe it was probably Alex who once suggested a method that
>> chooses the candidate who wins at Nash equilibrium.
>>
>> Alex, could you repeat that method definition again?
I never designed such a method.
> From: "James Gilmour" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>
> Jeff wrote:
> > Interesting question. I agree with your answer except for
> > the size of the districts. According to Duverger, a district
> > size of 10 supports 11 parties.
>
> What does this statement mean? I am not aware that there is any
On Mon, Jan 05, 2004 at 04:07:08PM +, MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
>
> I believe it was probably Alex who once suggested a method that chooses the
> candidate who wins at Nash equilibrium.
>
> Alex, could you repeat that method definition again?
There's probably been more than one method like this.
Jeffrey O'Neill wrote:
> In MA, the smaller house is 40 and the larger house is 160. I think it
> would be desirable to create districts solely for the smaller house and
> then use the same districts as 4-member districts for the larger house.
> This would create an interesting geographical linkag
Jeff wrote:
> Interesting question. I agree with your answer except for
> the size of the districts. According to Duverger, a district
> size of 10 supports 11 parties.
What does this statement mean? I am not aware that there is any direct relationship
between
district magnitude and the num
I said:
Ties are solved by having all the rankings give an Approval vote to each of
their ranked candidates.
That should say "...to each of their ranked candidates who are in the tie".
So it should say:
Ties are solved by having all the rankings give an Approval vote to each of
their ranked can
I believe it was probably Alex who once suggested a method that chooses the
candidate who wins at Nash equilibrium.
Alex, could you repeat that method definition again?
It sounds like a promising method. I was suggesting that, for Nash
equilbrium for voting, a "player" be a set of same-voting
Hi Alex,
Interesting question. I agree with your answer except for the size of the
districts. According to Duverger, a district size of 10 supports 11 parties.
If each party runs a full slate, then there would be 110 candidates. I would
prefer a district size of 4-5 to reduce the number of can
Condorcet wrote ("Essai sur l'application de l'analyse
a la probabilite des decisions rendues a la pluralite
des voix," Imprimerie Royale, Paris, p. LXVIII of the
introduction, 1785):
From the considerations we have just made we get the
general rule that whenever we have to choose we have
to take s
Chris said:
"For IRV, sincere rankings are fine, because IRV has its serious strategy
problems even if everyone votes sincerely."
Isn't the phrase "strategy problems..if everyone votes sincerely"
oxymoronic?
I repl
Sure, on the average, Approval is like sincere Borda. Surely often they'd
both give the same result. Sorry if I misunderstood and replied as if you'd
meant they always do. One is more likely to vote for one's 2nd choice than
one's 3rd choice, and so, overall, the effect could be like Borda.
A
In Approval, everyone should vote strategically. When there's no
information
about other voters' preferences or voting plans, people should vote for the
above-mean candidates. But if the voter doesn't have ratings, but only a
ranking of the candidates, then, as I said, s/he should vote for the b
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