Dear election methods fans,
Does anyone remember my proposal for a voting procedure which I posted on
December 17th, titled "a strategic problem and possible remedy for
Condorcet-efficient voting methods"? Here is the link, to make it
easier...
http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/electi
I like the idea of Voronoi polygons for automated districting, but there
since this *is* the "election methods" list, there is another possibility --
allow the people to vote for the districting method at the same time they are
voting for candidates. It might work something like:
1. Distri
I propose and reccomend this single-winner
Condorcet compliant method:
Plain ranked-ballots, equal preferences and truncation ok.
1: Eliminate all candidates who are not members of the Schwartz set.
2: If more than one candidate remains, then based
On Fri, 16 Jan 2004, Forest Simmons wrote:
> The only vote would be to decide on which objective measure of over-all
> compactness to adopt.
>
> If anybody is thinking about a boundary based measure, please tell me how
> to find the geographical boundary of the partition suggested by Stephane
>
On Thu, 15 Jan 2004, Alex Small wrote:
> Forest suggested that election districts should be drawn by defining a
> center for each district, and specifying that district i will be the set
> of all points which are closer to center i than any other center. He
> suggested that "closer" be measured
On Thu, 15 Jan 2004, Ernest Prabhakar wrote:
>
> I think the real question -- and the real problem -- is that if I
> remember correctly Joe's proposal requires:
> a) objective criteria
> b) some voting method for deciding between them
>
> If we have a determinate objective criteria, I don't see w
On Thu, 15 Jan 2004, Forest Simmons wrote:
>
> If there are n districts and N voters per district, then the number of
> within district distances to average together would be
>
>N*n*(n-1)/2 ,
>
Should read n*N*(N-1)/2 .
Forest
Election-methods mailing list - see http://
Alex & Matt,
I think these two questions are about the same:
Matt responds:
the objectively measurable optimization goal (such as smallest total
road cuts count or perimeters length) with objectively defined
constraints (such as per district maximum acceptable population size
deviance from ide
At 10:40 AM 1/16/2004 +, MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
Does anyone know the date of the EM message in which someone spoke of
electing someone who can win at Nash equilibrium?
I'm not sure, but you may be referring to the "Equilibrium in Approval
Voting" thread that began on April 4, 2002.
-Adam
---
My first impression is that none of those versions of ACC can meet all the
majority defensive strategy criteria, beause they don't say to delete every
candidate who has a majority defeat.
But I shouldn't say that for sure at this hour of the night (3:00 A.M.).
And so I've printed out those 3 po
Chris wrote:
This seems very similar to "Approval Completed Condorcet" (ACC) which is
discussed in these 2002 postings by Adam Tarr
I don't want to plagarize or claim credit for anyone else's proposal. That's
why I've been asking what better-method proposals have been made.
In fact, I also said
I said that offensive truncation, offensive order-reversal, and defensive
truncation are present in all the best methods, including the very best.
I should clarify that offensive truncation is not a concern in any of the
best methods, including wv, and including any marginally better methods tha
3. If more than 1 remain, apply Approval, electing the candidate above the
most voters' Approval cutoffs.
You wrote:
Chris Benham's suggestion would make sense here: any ballots that approve
all or none of the remaining candidates could be minimally adjusted to
make them relevant in step 3.
Abso
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