Markus--
You said:
so far as election methods are defined only on the cast
preferences and not on the sincere preferences, whether a
given election method satisfies a given criterion must be
reflected in the way this method uses the cast preferences.
Therefore, there is no need to include the
Dear Mike,
your latest mail doesn't make any sense in so far as
you wrote several times that you don't want me to
suggest how to word things. Therefore, I suggest that
you should look e.g. how Steve Eppley words things:
http://www.alumni.caltech.edu/~seppley
Markus Schulze
Election-methods
It is often asserted that Cardinal Ratings is strategically equivalent to
Approval Voting. In the context of a single election I completely agree.
You're either going to do everything you can to help a candidate win, or
else you won't. However, I have argued in the past that when one takes a
From: James Gilmour
Subject: RE: [EM] Extremely simple voting for committee
Date: Sun, 1 Feb 2004 08:30:24 -
It seems
to me to be a simple Yes / No ballot. I accept the Committee as it
stands or I do not accept the Committee as it stands. (What happens
if the majority of those who
For 0-info, I am almost convinced that Vote for the above-mean
candidates is the strategy to use. I'll start from the beginning. (Note
that what I'll be doing won't be exactly how Weber presents his
calculations inpublications.)
In order to work out what a voter should put on an Approval
Markus--
Not only does Plurality pass your SDSC, but BeatpathWinner fails it:
AB51, BC52, CA52
B wins in BeatpathWinner, though more than half of the voters have ranked A
over B.
Your critrerion only applies if votes are admissible. I don't know what
admissible means, but, by any reasonable
