--- Rob LeGrand <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> The latest issue (March 2004) of Scientific American has a well-written
> article on page 92 called "The Fairest Vote of All". It discusses
> plurality, IRV, Borda ("rank-order voting") and Condorcet ("true majority
> rule"); the specific system th
Forest,
--- Forest Simmons <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit : > How about this:
>
> A preliminary ranking of the candidates by approval scores is modified by
> correcting the single greatest "discrepancy" (if there is any) unless
> correcting this discrepancy would create another discrepancy of the s
On Feb 13, 2004, at 9:59 AM, Rob LeGrand wrote:
The latest issue (March 2004) of Scientific American has a well-written
article on page 92 called "The Fairest Vote of All". It discusses
plurality, IRV, Borda ("rank-order voting") and Condorcet ("true
majority
rule"); the specific system they rec
It occurred to me that the phrase "The method allows full ranking of
all candidates" might be sufficient, instead of the more difficult
wording of my last message, depending on the correct interpretation of
the following:
"votes sincerely"
and
"falsely voting two candidates equal"
To help in
How about this:
A preliminary ranking of the candidates by approval scores is modified by
correcting the single greatest "discrepancy" (if there is any) unless
correcting this discrepancy would create another discrepancy of the same
or greater magnitude.
A "discrepancy" is a pair of candidates wh
The latest issue (March 2004) of Scientific American has a well-written
article on page 92 called "The Fairest Vote of All". It discusses
plurality, IRV, Borda ("rank-order voting") and Condorcet ("true majority
rule"); the specific system they recommend in the end is Copeland//Borda.
Check it ou
Last night I wrote that I would add a provision to my definitions to
ensure they apply to more than rank methods. Unfortunately I became so
focused on interpreting the allowable strategies in the original
definitions that I forgot to include that phrasing. I realized my
error only after shutting
Mike,
Thanks for the reply.
--- MIKE OSSIPOFF <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit : >
> You're probably familiar with this Approval improvement:
>
> Voters cast an Approval ballot, but also vote for a 1st choice. If any
> candidate is 1st choice of a majority, s/he wins. Otherwise the Approval
> win
I nominate those three methods just to show how different they work on:
Ranked Pair (relative margins),
Ranked Pair (winning votes) with an extended graph,
IRV with residual approval weights.
The last method picks the same winner as IRV but can have different
results for
other places...
Have fun
James Green-Armytage a écrit :
> "MIKE OSSIPOFF" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> >No need to pick a method first, because we don't need one winner. Nothing
> >wrong with getting different winners by using different methods. In fact,
> >that's better, because it tests more methods and compares their
You're probably familiar with this Approval improvement:
Voters cast an Approval ballot, but also vote for a 1st choice. If any
candidate is 1st choice of a majority, s/he wins. Otherwise the Approval
winner wins.
Bucklin uses rankings, but is probably the best of the easily-counted rank
metho
Ok, Markus, I guess you definitely aren't going to say what you mean by
"prefer". And that's ok.
You said:
an election method is a mapping from a given input to a
given output. Where this input comes from or what this
input actually represents is of no concern as long
as it has the properties re
Richard--
You said:
Actually I was able to get to those revisions tonight also. It's
possible that I've still made errors in the interpretation of the
electionmethods.org wording, but I hope not. I'm sure I'll hear from
Mike if I did.
I reply:
That much is correct. Plurality still meets all 4 of
Richard--
Regarding your revised versions of the majority defensive strategy criteria:
Ok, but I've already told you how votes-only versions of those criteria can
be written. I described 2 votes-only ways, in my posting entitled "3 Ways of
Writing Certain Criteria".
One of those ways involves
Let me add a few additional comments about Richard's message:
Richard said:
Any of the strategic criteria on the electionmethods.org site can be
defined without reference to "sincere preferences" or "favorites".
I reply:
In my message entitled "3 Ways of Writing Certain Criteria", I said that
S
> Date: Wed, 11 Feb 2004 06:12:09 -0800
> From: James Green-Armytage
> Subject: [EM] poll fever
> I'd suggest that we give the candidates cardinal ratings from one to a
> hundred too, but I guess that may as well be optional, since I don't
> want to make this any more complicated than it is alread
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