Forest,
Thanks for your interest and kind words. I may have mis-identified this
as Joe Weinstein's "weighted median approval" method:
Voters rank the candidates, equal preferences ok.
Each candidate is given a weight of 1 for
Each ballot in the ballot set B is converted into a vector of ones, zeros,
and negative ones in the most natural way that you can imagine.
Next, a special set S of vectors, each of which has all components set to
zero except two components, a one and a zero, is also created.
The "distance" from e
> From: Gervase Lam
> Subject: Re: [EM] Nominations for presidential poll
> Date: Tue, 17 Feb 2004 00:12:43 +
>
> > Date: Fri, 13 Feb 2004 08:00:00 -0500
> > From: Stephane Rouillon
> > Subject: Re: [EM] Nominations for presidential poll
> >
> > I nominate those three methods just to show how d
On Feb 20, 2004, at 12:38 AM, MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
I hope .. that article is in the print issue of Sci Am too.
Yes, it is. I agree with you - the overall tone was very positive and
useful, and will encourage to people consider Condorcet-compliant
(Majority Rule) methods.
Why did the Sci Am aut
When I commented yesterday about the Sci. Am. article, it was incorrect to
say that circular ties were only introduced in the paragraph that defined
Copeland. They'd mentioned circular ties earlier, but it was in that
paragraph that they brought up the matter of solving them.
They didn't call C
On Thursday 19 Feb 2004 10:38 am, MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
> The owner of the Agora polling website wrote:
>
> > I wouldn't want to seem too presumptuous, but polls are
> > what the bulletin board (agora at www.masquilier.org)
> > has been designed for.
> I reply:
>
> Sure, that would be interesting,
