Hi all,
On Feb 25, 2004, at 9:36 PM, Ken Johnson wrote:
CR is strategically equiovalent to Approval: In CR, you maximize your
expectation by giving maximum points to those candidates for whom
you'd vote in Approval, and giving minimum points to the rest.
This statement has always puzzled me. I
Ken Johnson wrote:
Suppose my preference ranking (inferred from my "sincere" CR ratings) is
A > B > C. Naturally, I should strategically give A the highest possible
rating and C the lowest. If I know A will beat C, I should give B the
lowest rating to ensure that A wins over B. If I know C will
Message: 3
Date: Wed, 25 Feb 2004 01:15:41 +
From: "MIKE OSSIPOFF" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: [EM] There's nothing wrong with Average Rating.
...
CR is strategically equiovalent to Approval: In CR, you maximize your
expectation by giving maximum points to those candidates for whom
you
(use fixed fonts)
Not being a US citizen, and not knowing most of the
candidates, my ballot is a bit wasted.
A bit like Rob, I think that anyone I don't know has a 50-50
chance to be a good guy (I'm optimistic ;-) ), so I rank
them and the others accordingly.
I approve of all the candidates I
I can think of two general approaches to applying cluster analysis to
election methods:
(1) First construct a vector representing each candidate by (say)
averaging the ballot vectors together that give the highest rating or
ranking to the candidate. If first place is shared, weight accordingly.
On Tue, 24 Feb 2004, Gervase Lam wrote:
>
> I think this average Approval quota method may have clone problems and is
> not Independent of Irrelevant Alternatives. But I really mention the
> method in the hope that somebody make changes to improve it or at least
> use it for inspiration.
I li
