Markus Schulze wrote:
>>Arrow proved that there is no single-winner election method with
>>the following four properties:
>> 1) It is a rank method (= a ranked-preference method).
>> 2) It satisfies Pareto.
>> 3) It is non-dictatorial.
>> 4) It satisfies IIA.
Ken Johnson wrote:
> But wh
Date: Mon, 01 Mar 2004 12:37:08 +0100
From: Markus Schulze <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
...
Arrow proved that there is no single-winner election method with
the following four properties:
1) It is a rank method (= a ranked-preference method).
2) It satisfies Pareto.
3) It is non-dictatorial.
4) It
Hello,
those of you who were put off from voting given the size and
the generally clumsy layout of the Condorcet poll, can now
take part in the vote.
As mentionned in the news section of the home page
www.masquilier.org and in the changelog, the layout is much
more user friendly now.
You may
Ken Johnson wrote:
So is it correct to say that Arrow did not prove that "there is no
perfect voting system"; he only proved that the methods he deems to be
acceptable are imperfect?
Ken Johnson
I would think that "perfect" and "imperfect" (in this context) are
value judgements.
Theorems are
A few weeks ago I mentioned that I was going to run an Oscar Vote for
a local movie group that I am involved in in the Washington DC area.
Had a total of 17 voters.
Everyone did not vote in each category.
I have include the complete ballots.
There were no ties, when votes were submitted, and only
Approval cutoff: between rank 1 and rank 2
candidates ranks approvalCR
Howard Dean5 83
Edwards 10 70
Kerry 7
Dear Ken,
I wrote (29 Feb 2004):
> My favorite formulation of Arrow's Theorem is Pattanaik and Peleg's
> formulation (Prasanta K. Pattanaik, Bezalel Peleg, "Distribution of
> Power Under Stochastic Social Choice Rules," Econometrica, vol. 54,
> p. 909-921, 1986). In their formulation, this theorem
