Thanks Steve,
That's great stuff and it does indeed answer my questions.
I will soon upload two large documents documenting (for
beginners) a Condorcet ballot and a Condorcet matrix.
After that, I'll concentrate on the rather
sketchy/innacurate series of articles I posted
http://www.masquili
> From: "Steve Eppley"
> Date: Wed, 03 Mar 2004 06:58:22 -0800
> Subject: Arrow's axioms (was Re: [EM] Re: [Fwd: Election-methods digest,
> Vol 1 #525 - 9 msgs])
> By Arrow's
> time, they'd learned that, lacking mind-reading
> technologies, they couldn't elicit cardinal utilities that
> could be c
Message: 1
Date: Thu, 04 Mar 2004 00:52:52 +1030
From: Chris Benham <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
...
To my mind, Approval does NOT satisfy Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA), ...
Initial two candidate election (with ratings out of ten).
01: A(9)>>B(1)
99: B(8)>>A(7)
B wins 99 to 1. Now
Steve wrote:
> > Steve Eppley had written:
> > > That's true, except there's no need to count the ballots in
> > > each pile. It's quicker to compare the heights of each
> > > pile by eye to see which is shortest, unless the shortest
> > > piles are very similar to each other in height, in whic
James Gilmore wrote:
> Steve Eppley wrote:
> > That's true, except there's no need to count the ballots in
> > each pile. It's quicker to compare the heights of each
> > pile by eye to see which is shortest, unless the shortest
> > piles are very similar to each other in height, in which
> > c
Steve Eppley wrote:
> That's true, except there's no need to count the ballots in
> each pile. It's quicker to compare the heights of each
> pile by eye to see which is shortest, unless the shortest
> piles are very similar to each other in height, in which
> case you might want to count the s
James Gilmour asked:
> Steve Eppley wrote:
> -snip-
> > Well, that's all I know about arguments against allowing
> > truncation. Perhaps others will be able to add more.
>
> Are you suggesting voters should be forced to express
> preferences they do not have? James
No, I was answering August
James Gilmore wrote:
> Steve Eppley wrote:
> > The third explanation is a hold-over from elections that
> > tally Instant Runoff (or the proportional representation
> > version, Single Transferable Vote) by hand. To quickly
> > tally Instant Runoff by hand:
> >
> >Distribute the ballots i
You wrote:
(I) 40% chance:
A: 101
B: 102
C: 104
(II) 60% chance:
A: 100
B: 104
C: 105
Now, if Voter X's true preference is A > B > C, the most effective
ranking in this particular case is:
A: 5
B: 3
C: 1
In case (I), this means his preferred A can win, whereas in case (II)
it at least his second
Steve Eppley wrote:
> The third explanation is a hold-over from elections that
> tally Instant Runoff (or the proportional representation
> version, Single Transferable Vote) by hand. To quickly
> tally Instant Runoff by hand:
>
>Distribute the ballots into piles, each according to
>i
Steve Eppley wrote:
> Well, that's all I know about arguments against allowing
> truncation. Perhaps others will be able to add more.
Are you suggesting voters should be forced to express preferences they do not have?
James
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for l
Hi,
Several days ago, Augustin asked:
-snip-
> a couple of weeks ago I wrote to this
> list asking for your help especially in regard to some
> theories that are behind the decisions I have made when
> developing the site.
>
> The only help I received was in the form of welcome
> criti
Steve, excellent post. I have to nit-pick one point, though.
Steve Epply wrote:
> I think it's dangerous to argue for a weak reform now and then later
> come back and say "we were only kidding, here's something that will
> really work."
I agree -- so long as we're restricted to only arguing for
Markus Schulze wrote:
-snip-
> Here is a very similar desideratum (Steve Eppley's "independence
> from Pareto-dominated alternatives"; IPDA):
>
>Candidate x is weakly Pareto-dominated if and only if
>there exists a candidate y such that at least one
>voter ranks y over x and no voter
Dave Ketchum wrote:
> So you insist on leaving out my message, making the example empty.
I wouldn't call the raw numbers in your example "empty." In fact, I
basically agree with your interpretation of them, with or without the
accompanying backstory.
I'm simply trying to provide the details of
Ken Johnson wrote:
-snip-
> > From: "[EMAIL PROTECTED]" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> ...
> >> But why did Arrow stipulate #1? (rank method)
-snip-
> Based on the preceding discussions, I infer the following:
> (1) Arrow's theorem is based on an unjustified and
> (according to the theorem's conclusion) ind
In case anyone hasn't heard, the IRV measure in Berkeley, CA passed
with an overwhelming majority of the vote.
Good news is that it would seem that in this case the voters were
open to a ranked ballot election method.
Bad news is that it was IRV.
Election-methods mailing list - see http
Dear Chris,
I wrote (1 March 2004):
> Arrow proved that there is no single-winner election method with
> the following four properties:
>
>1) It is a rank method (= a ranked-preference method).
>2) It satisfies Pareto.
>3) It is non-dictatorial.
>4) It satisfies IIA.
>
> All four p
Dear Eric,
you wrote (2 March 2004):
> I am currently in communication with a dedicated IRV supporter
> who may be claiming that they would move away from IRV if a
> real example could be given where IRV selected an obviously
> wrong winner.
To find such an example it is necessary that you post h
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