I wrote:
> http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2001-August/006566.html
> Your response in that post, that Richard's proposed implementation didn't
> capture the higher expressivity of dyadic ballots,
Sorry, Richard Moore was responding to Roy Johnson's proposal
Forest Simmons wrote:
> As near as I know, the only deterministic method that satisfies
> neutrality, anonymity, and the strong FBC (instrumentally as opposed to
> merely expressively) is a method that uses additional information beyond
> the rankings. [It allows voters to augment their ranked bal
Kevin Venzke wrote:
> It's surely a fluke that "Two Evils" outperforms "Zero-Info" here. I
> have to doubt that random information could be better than none at all.
I wonder if it might make sense to think of the random information as a
signal that can be productively exploited to organize coope
Kevin Venzke wrote:
"Message: 3
"Date: Thu, 4 Mar 2004 07:44:50 +0100 (CET)
"From: =?iso-8859-1?q?Kevin=20Venzke?= <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
"To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
"Subject: [EM] Simulation results (Approval, utility, Schulze "efficiency)
"
"Hi all,
"
"I've been sitting on this for a while, but I'm thin
I am sure others are aware of this data, but I just got my hands on
it and spent some time analyzing it with single winner methods.
Apparently in Dr. Tideman's research into voting methods, he was able
to obtain many (86) ranked ballots from elections held in England.
I uploaded everything into
On Wed, 3 Mar 2004, Steve Eppley wrote:
>
> I consider Arrow's axioms justifiable. In the decades
> leading up to Arrow's theorem, economists and social
> scientists had struggled in vain to find a good way to
> compare different individuals' utility differences (known
> in the literature as the
Jan,
Thanks for responding.
--- Jan Kok <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> > (Description of it:)
> > 1. It generates randomly-sized factions, and their sincere utilities for
> every candidate.
>
> It sounds like you assume that all voters in a faction vote identically. I
> would suggest that yo
Kevin Venzke wrote:
> Hi all,
>
> I've been sitting on this for a while, but I'm thinking I'll post it now:
>
>
> Here are some results from the simulation I recently wrote about:
>
> (Description of it:)
> 1. It generates randomly-sized factions, and their sincere utilities for
every candidate.
I
Hello,
Steve Eppley wrote:
> To quickly
> tally Instant Runoff by hand:
>
>Distribute the ballots into piles, each according to
>its top-ranked candidate. From the height of each pile,
>you can see at a glance which pile has the fewest
>ballots. So, if there are more than two
Ken,
--- Ken Johnson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit : >
> Arrow's axioms could well be justifiable, but his proof doesn't provide
> the justification. There may be good reasons why CR should be rejected
> as a viable election method, but Arrow's premises don't elucidate those
> reasons because i
From: "Steve Eppley" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Date: Wed, 03 Mar 2004 06:58:22 -0800
...
I consider Arrow's axioms justifiable. In the decades leading up to
Arrow's theorem, economists and social scientists had struggled in
vain to find a good way to compare different individuals' utility
differen
Hi all,
I've been sitting on this for a while, but I'm thinking I'll post it now:
Here are some results from the simulation I recently wrote about:
(Description of it:)
1. It generates randomly-sized factions, and their sincere utilities for every
candidate.
2. The sincere Schulze winner is fo
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