Re: [EM] Approval vs ??

2004-03-25 Thread Bart Ingles
I don't disagree with Mike's post, but would point out that the differences between Condorcet and Approval with regard to SU are fairly small. With results averaged over many runs, Condorcet generally has the edge over Approval. Although in Merrill's "Making Multicandidate Elections More Democra

Re: [EM] Majority Criterion, actually Mutual Majority Criterion (MMC)

2004-03-25 Thread Bart Ingles
My reference to Woodall was mainly with regard to nomenclature. Some of his criteria names are a little confusing alongside prior naming conventions. But then I'm a software engineer-- I'm always griping about other peoples' variable & function names. James Green-Armytage wrote: > >

Re: [EM] non-binding direct democracy system

2004-03-25 Thread Ernest Prabhakar
Hi James, On Mar 25, 2004, at 8:46 PM, James Green-Armytage wrote: I suggest that the single-winner methods that might give us centrist leaders, specifically Condorcet-efficient methods, would also have the potential to give us centrist, compromise solutions to social problems. Ah, thank

Re: [EM] Rankings made by another method

2004-03-25 Thread Eric Gorr
At 8:07 PM -0800 3/25/04, James Green-Armytage wrote: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: What is sincere (= will best achieve the desired result = election of most preferred candidate) in one voting system This isn't how I generally understand the concept of sincere voting. In a ranked ballot system, I wo

[EM] Re: another idea (proportionality and intra-party competition)

2004-03-25 Thread Toplak Jurij
> Date: Wed, 24 Mar 2004 17:21:21 +0100 (CET) > From: Kevin Venzke > Subject: [EM] another idea (proportionality and intra-party competition) > > Open list. Each voter votes for one list, and *any number* of > candidates within that list. So it's Approval within the party, and the > party's me

[EM] Re: another idea (proportionality and intra-party competition)

2004-03-25 Thread Gervase Lam
> Date: Wed, 24 Mar 2004 17:21:21 +0100 (CET) > From: =?iso-8859-1?q?Kevin=20Venzke?= > Subject: [EM] another idea (proportionality and intra-party competition) > Open list.  Each voter votes for one list, and *any number* of > candidates within that list.  So it's Approval within the party, and t

Re: [EM] Rankings made by another method

2004-03-25 Thread James Green-Armytage
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: >What is sincere (= will best achieve the desired >result = election of most preferred candidate) in one voting system This isn't how I generally understand the concept of sincere voting. In a ranked ballot system, I would hold sincere voting to the following definition

Re: [EM] Majority Criterion, actually Mutual Majority Criterion (MMC)

2004-03-25 Thread James Green-Armytage
>>majority criterion: If a majority of the voters prefers all of the >members >>of a given set of candidates over all candidates outside that set, and >>they vote sincerely, then the winning candidate should come from that >set. Bart >This sounds like >Woodall's terminology > Mike > >I'm going to

RE: [EM] Rankings made by another method

2004-03-25 Thread James Gilmour
> James Gilmour said: > > I would suggest that analysing (counting) by a > different method the voting patterns of votes cast for > counting under one method will not give a > very useful result. > MIKE OSSIPOFF > Sent: Thursday, March 25, 2004 11:59 PM > > ...unless sincere voting is assumed.

[EM] Falsifying voters' rankings

2004-03-25 Thread MIKE OSSIPOFF
Dave Ketchum wrote: " BTW - I do see "=" for equal - and equality among several candidates. Since, at any instant, Condorcet is only concerned with a single pair, more equality does not make more complexity. Two voters voting A=B A=B should net the same results as voting A>B and A I reply: It sho

[EM] Majority Criterion, actually Mutual Majority Criterion (MMC)

2004-03-25 Thread MIKE OSSIPOFF
Bart wrote: In an earlier post, I didn't pay close enough attention to the definition for this criterion: James Green-Armytage wrote: majority criterion: If a majority of the voters prefers all of the members of a given set of candidates over all candidates outside that set, and they vote sincerel

[EM] Rankings made by another method

2004-03-25 Thread MIKE OSSIPOFF
James Gilmour said: I would suggest that analysing (counting) by a different method the voting patterns of votes cast for counting under one method will not give a very useful result. I reply: ...unless sincere voting is assumed. And IRVists claim that voting will be sincere in IRV. You can't

[EM] Approval vs ??

2004-03-25 Thread MIKE OSSIPOFF
Much of the criticism of Approval is done in a vacuum. I always want to reply: "...So then, Approval is worse thanwhat?" IRV? James cited Mutual Majority (MMC) as Approval's failing. But the mutual majority situations where MMC applies are situations where IRV demonstrates its failure of

Re: [EM] non-binding direct democracy system

2004-03-25 Thread James Green-Armytage
This is the continuation of an exchange between myself (James), and Mr. Prabhakar. The only other comment I'm aware of has come from Ms. Dotan. Does anyone else want to jump in? Is there anyone on the list who has an opinion on the direct democracy versus representative democracy question?

Re: [EM] non-binding direct democracy system

2004-03-25 Thread Ernest Prabhakar
Hi James, On Mar 25, 2004, at 9:15 AM, James Green-Armytage wrote: I guess I would take your proposal more seriously if it included a critique of how referenda system work in other places (like California), and why your proposal would improve upon them. Right now, it sounded to me more like a p

Re: [EM] non-binding direct democracy system

2004-03-25 Thread James Green-Armytage
Ernest Prabhakar <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: >I owe you an apology. I'm sorry I came across as negative or >derogatory. Gladly accepted. >I suppose I'm just a little cynical about direct >democracy, having lived in California for 15 years. > > I sympathize with your viewpoint about