I think the issue with multi-winner primaries is not whether they are
proportional, or even whether the elect clones, but whether they advance
at least one winnable candidate to the general election. But I suppose
a proportional system would be more likely to do so due to the "shotgun
effect" of
I think the issue with multi-winner primaries is not whether they are
proportional, or even whether the elect clones, but whether they advance
at least one winnable candidate to the general election. But I suppose
a proportional system would be more likely to do so due to the "shotgun
effect" of
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Subject: Election-methods digest, Vol 1 #573 - 4 msgs
Date: Wed, 31 Mar 2004 12:02:40 -0800
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We have about worn out this thread:
A primary before a ranked ballot general election has its own needs,
UNLIKE those preceding a Plurality general election.
Perhaps multiple primary winners would make sense. If so, needs are
unlike those of a PR election.
I like the method to be
Forest,
--- Forest Simmons <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> > A method I would rank between Condorcet and Approval is AER, or "Approval STV."
> > It's IRV, but the elimination order is based on approval. Because the approval
> > counts don't change, and the elimination order is thus fixed from t
It looks like Long Beach is a model for where the whole country is headed.
On Fri, 26 Mar 2004, Joe Weinstein wrote:
>
> I don't have much time for most ins and outs on this list (or others), but
> was delighted to read James' stimulatingly-argued detailed proposal for a
> 'non-binding direct d
On Wed, 31 Mar 2004, [iso-8859-1] Kevin Venzke wrote:
>
> A method I would rank between Condorcet and Approval is AER, or "Approval STV."
> It's IRV, but the elimination order is based on approval. Because the approval
> counts don't change, and the elimination order is thus fixed from the beginn
There's really only one issue left worth discussing in this thread, so I'll
cut the rest out:
Dave Ketchum wrote and I responded, et cetera:
Puzzle: Assuming the above leads to Condorcet in the primary,
to select two candidates for the general election - WHY NOT? the
arguments are not n
On Wed, 31 Mar 2004 12:14:45 -0500 Adam Tarr wrote:
I don't think we really disagree about anything meaningful, Dave.
I imagine this is common, but they are really doing the primary on
behalf of the party. The party could decide to not have a primary,
just as the state could decide to not do t
I don't think we really disagree about anything meaningful, Dave.
I imagine this is common, but they are really doing the primary on behalf
of the party. The party could decide to not have a primary, just as the
state could decide to not do the party the favor of administering it.
About 100 yea
The answer is no.
Clearly if a and b are eliminated,
the ballot of your voter had no impact on it
(a>b) or (a>b>c>d).
So those last preferences kick in only once a and b are eliminated co you are better
with the full preferences to
avoid at least d over c.
However their is an incentive for unsinc
Eric Gorr> Sent: Wednesday, March 31, 2004 12:40 AM
> Consider a case with four candidates and a voter who casts a ballot:
> a > b > c > d
> but does not want to see either C or D win the election. It does not
> seem to me that the voter would be any better off if they had cast a
> ballot:
>
Mike,
--- MIKE OSSIPOFF <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit : >
> Approval & CR are the 2nd best, if we're talking about proposed methods.
> Bucklin and ERBucklin(whole) are between Condorcet and Approval, in merit.
> But Bucklin & ERBucklin(whole) aren't proposed.
In my opinion, Bucklin versions are
James A. wrote:
A couple of quick questions, Mike. One, what is the difference between
strong FBC and regular FBC?
I reply:
Strong FBC makes the additional requirement that no one ever have strategic
incent
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