Re: [EM] Does the 'Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives Criterion' Imply a

2004-04-01 Thread Alex Small
Adam said: > This is not a rigorous proof, since I did not provide a rigorous > justification why C should win the pairwise contest (although it is > obvious). But this example suffices to show, in my opinion, that no > reasonable method will ever pass IIA. Adam- I think we could take your argum

Re: [EM] Does the 'Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives Criterion' Imply a

2004-04-01 Thread James Green-Armytage
Adam Tarr quoted from me: >> I have to say that I don't think it makes sense for an >individual to >>prefer A to B, B to C, and C to A. It's just logically contradictory. >>Individual preferences should be assumed to be transitive. then Adam Tarr wrote: > >I've argued the same thing in the

Re: [EM] Does the 'Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives Criterion' Imply a

2004-04-01 Thread Adam Tarr
I have to say that I don't think it makes sense for an individual to prefer A to B, B to C, and C to A. It's just logically contradictory. Individual preferences should be assumed to be transitive. I've argued the same thing in the past, but ultimately the same argument can be made withou

Re: [EM] Does the 'Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives Criterion' Imply a

2004-04-01 Thread James Green-Armytage
Forest Simmons <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: >To make this really simple, suppose that there is only one chooser, and >that there are three choices, and that the chooser prefers A to B to C to >A, with varying levels of intensity. Suppose that the chooser finally >decides to choose A. But before an

[EM] Candidate Transfer

2004-04-01 Thread Forest Simmons
I would like to name the simplest version of Candidate Proxy "Candidate Transfer." In this version, at each stage of the proxy runoff, the remaining candidate with the fewest votes (originals plus any transferred from other candidates) must transfer them irrevocably to one of the other remaining c

Re: [EM] Does the 'Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives Criterion' Imply a Condorcet Winner ?

2004-04-01 Thread Forest Simmons
On Thu, 1 Apr 2004, Rob Speer wrote: > On Tue, Mar 30, 2004 at 05:26:02PM -0300, Marcos C. Ribeiro wrote: > > THE CONCLUSIONS ARE: > > -> If IAA is a false criterion, it doesn't make sense to verify if any method > > fulfils it. We must be very secure with the principles from which we start. To

Re: [EM] Does the 'Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives Criterion' Imply a Condorcet Winner ?

2004-04-01 Thread Rob Speer
On Tue, Mar 30, 2004 at 05:26:02PM -0300, Marcos C. Ribeiro wrote: > THE CONCLUSIONS ARE: > -> If IAA is a false criterion, it doesn't make sense to verify if any method > fulfils it. We must be very secure with the principles from which we start. To > verify false criterions is to go in a wrong

Re: [EM] Primaries?

2004-04-01 Thread Bart Ingles
Adam Tarr wrote: > > >I think the issue with multi-winner primaries is not whether they are > >proportional, or even whether the elect clones, but whether they advance > >at least one winnable candidate to the general election. But I suppose > >a proportional system would be more likely to do s