Dave,
I agree that ballot secrecy is important, in order to avoid the possibility
of vote buying or coersion. The Newsweek article made that point as well,
and I believe all of the schemes presented in the article do provide that
secrecy.
I do think it's neat that the Votegrity scheme provides t
I just read an excellent professional discussion of E-Voting Strategies.
I give the URL in one piece, if you are lucky, and two pieces for obvious
patching together:
http://www.opctj.org/articles/kevin-mcdermott-01-24-2004-142018.html
http://www.opctj.org/articles/kevin-
mcdermott-01-24-2004-14
On Sat, 3 Apr 2004 18:24:41 -0700 Jan Kok wrote:
The March 29, 2004 issue of Newsweek magazine has an article about security
for electronic voting. Among the proposals mentioned are
Rebecca Mercuri's verified voting scheme, which requires that machines print
a paper ballot with the voter's choice
Ken Taylor a écrit :
> And finally, as IRV is immune to this particular strategy (a claim made both
> by you and by the author of the article I was responding to), using IRV as a
> completion method would also be immune to this particular strategy. And so,
> my argument against the contention that
The March 29, 2004 issue of Newsweek magazine has an article about security
for electronic voting. Among the proposals mentioned are
Rebecca Mercuri's verified voting scheme, which requires that machines print
a paper ballot with the voter's choices, that the voter can then check for
accuracy;
D
I'd said:
Approval & CR are the 2nd best, if we're talking about proposed methods.
Bucklin and ERBucklin(whole) are between Condorcet and Approval, in
merit. But Bucklin & ERBucklin(whole) aren't proposed.
James A.
Ken Johnson wrote:
In your earlier post (Election-methods digest, Vol 1 #576, Message 7)
you defined INI ("Independence of Non-supporting Information") as
"If X wins and Y loses, and margin(X,Z) <= margin(Y,Z), then removing
candidate Z from the election shall not cause Y to win and X to lose."
Th
Date: Fri, 02 Apr 2004 21:39:43 -0800
From: Richard Moore <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
...
But what did you think of INI?
-- Richard
In your earlier post (Election-methods digest, Vol 1 #576, Message 7)
you defined INI ("Independence of Non-supporting Information") as
"If X wins and Y loses, and marg
James Wrote, responding to me:
> >I may have worded my response to the article too strongly. However, your
> >example, reposted here:
> >46: A>B
> >44: B>C (instead of B>A)
> >5: C>A
> >5: C>B
>
> Please note that there is a second example at the end of that posting;
> one which is stronger in that
To James and Ernie,
Thanks very much for your comments. I agree with Ernie that it's important to
be civil. If my comments regarding the CVD draft seemed unnecessarily
combative, that was not my intention, and I'll try to be more careful in the future.
But please keep in mind that I was respond
IMO a Condorcet winner weak enough to have the election stolen through
strategy probably deserves to lose the election. Regardless of the
cycle breaking method, a weak CW is subject to prisoner's dilemma, and
to what could be called "apathetic truncation." Neither should be
considered a real-wor
I just wanted to point out that I support
James (Armitage) analysis that any cycle breaking method applied to a
Condorcet method makes it subject to the unsincere ranking strategy
called
burying (not "digging" as I previously said) independently of the
criteria used
(winning votes, margins or relat
12 matches
Mail list logo
