Dave Ketchum wrote:
>> How about leaning on IMPORTANT topics:
>>
>> How well do these schemes attend to voter secrecy?
>> Without secrecy, voters can sell "voting right" to those willing
>> to pay for such.
>> Without assurance that secrecy is being maintained, voters can
>> PROPERLY fea
On Sun, 04 Apr 2004 12:51:59 -0500 Adam Tarr wrote:
> Dave Ketchum wrote:
>
>> How about leaning on IMPORTANT topics:
>>
>> How well do these schemes attend to voter secrecy?
>> Without secrecy, voters can sell "voting right" to those willing
>> to pay for such.
>> Without assurance that
On Sun, 4 Apr 2004 12:11:44 -0700 Ernest Prabhakar wrote:
> Hi all,
>
> On Apr 3, 2004, at 11:45 PM, Jan Kok wrote:
>
>> David Chaum's Votegrity scheme, which uses cryptographic methods
>> tomaintain
>> ballot secrecy while also allowing voters to verify that their votes are
>> counted correctly (
Chris,
--- Chris Benham <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> Kevin,
> You wrote (Wed.Mar.31):
>
> >A method I would rank between Condorcet and Approval is AER, or "Approval STV."
> >It's IRV, but the elimination order is based on approval. Because the approval
> >counts don't change, and the elim
This is James Green-Armytage replying to Ernest Prabhakar
>It seems to me that it is more or less an article of faith among
>Condorcet/Approval supporters that "if we build it, they will come."
Haha. Yes, that's a good way of putting it.
>
>That is, as long as we have an election metho
http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2003-September/010803.html
Dear John B. Hodges,
you wrote (1 Sep 2003):
> This method has been called "Generalized Bucklin", and AFAICT
> could also be called "Majority Choice Approval". My question,
> for on
If you trade Approval for ERIRV with AERLO, you're trading FBC for SDSC. If
the choice were only between Approval and ERIRV with AERLO, I'd probablly
choose ERIRV with AERLO, unless that od's FBC violation turned out to be
frequent and flagrant.
This is in answer to the question about how E
Adam Tarr <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
>I think you're being a bit too kind to IRV here. Say it was a general
>election in an area with a large progressive base, and the 22% Democrat
>was
>actually a Green. If the Green loses first, the Democrat wins 55%-45%,
>but
>if a few Republicans push the
Hi all,
On Apr 3, 2004, at 11:45 PM, Jan Kok wrote:
David Chaum's Votegrity scheme, which uses cryptographic methods
tomaintain
ballot secrecy while also allowing voters to verify that their votes
are
counted correctly (see www.votegrity.com);
"A similar system [to Votegrity] sold by sftware ve
This raises a question which has been in the back of my mind for a
while: what percentage of IRV's IIA violations are actually
monotonicity violations as well? I have always assumed that
non-monotonicity implies non-IIA, but not necessarily the reverse.
Monotonicity seems related to the partici
James Green-Armytage wrote:
I agree that lacking monotonicity isn't a huge problem for IRV.
It does
have *some* tactical significance, but it's not fatal. Actually I think
that the problem is theoretically worse in the traditional two round
runoff. For example, a case where a Republican h
Dave Ketchum wrote:
How about leaning on IMPORTANT topics:
How well do these schemes attend to voter secrecy?
Without secrecy, voters can sell "voting right" to those willing to
pay for such.
Without assurance that secrecy is being maintained, voters can
PROPERLY fear that, if they da
Hi James,
Great stuff. Overall I think both your analysis (of the issues) and
your approach (of respectful engagement) is an excellent model of how
to deal with IRV (and other controversial voting issues).
The only area of minor disagreement I had is that I felt you were
slightly more pessimi
Dear Election Methods fans,
Here is a copy of the letter which I wrote to CVD in reply to their IRV
vs. Condorcet draft, minus a few deletions. Comments are more than welcome.
all my best,
James
__
Dear Mr. Richie and Mr. Bouricius,
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