[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Now consider:
49 ACB
48 BCA
3 CBA
IRV winner = B; CW winner = C.
I doubt very much whether most electors would accept C as
the winner
if this were an election for Sate Governor, much less for a directly
elected President of the USA. If anyone has
Curt Siffert wrote:
I like this example a lot because I think it approaches the
nut of what social choice should actually mean.
The first case is pretty uncontroversial. What makes the second case
interesting is that there's this psychological impact to it.
This is the real issue. As
Hopefully this will be helpful to someone:
http://bolson.org/voting/vote_form.html
Submit a bunch of votes and it will be tallied according to
IRV,Borda,Condorcet,IRNR and raw rating summation.
It takes a slightly different format than things seem to be discussed
around here. It wants columns
Some addition:
The second and third example I gave seem to be related to another
Markov-chain method studied by Giora Slutzki and Oscar Volij (Scoring of
web pages and tournaments - axiomatizations, Working paper, Iowa State
University, 2003. Cited after Giora Slutzki and Oscar Volij: Ranking
James Gilmour wrote:
49 ACB
48 BCA
3 CBA
James Green-Armytage replied:
Well, if the votes were sincere to begin with, then it is
axiomatic that C will win a runoff election against B.
But if you did decide this by a separate run-off election, I should not be
On Sun, 16 May 2004, Jobst Heitzig wrote:
Neutrality: Now this is something I did not understand yet.
Quote:
Neutrality requires that if two problems are such that the ranking
method cannot rank any player [that is, any option! JH] above another,
then the ranking method should still be
Adam
Thanks for your helpful comments.
I think that such a vote could be marketed in a way that
would make it relatively uncontroversial. In cases with no first-place
majority winner,
Condorcet chooses the compromise candidate with the broadest base of
support.
Maybe, but I remain VERY
Message: 1
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Sat, 15 May 2004 23:09:19 -0700 (PDT)
...
I'm writing today to tell about my new favorite system:
Instant Runoff Normalized Ratings
(IRNR)
Every voter casts a rating of each choice on a scale of -1.0 to 1.0 or
some equivalent scale. Each voter's voting
Brian,
--- [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
Every voter casts a rating of each choice on a scale of -1.0 to 1.0 or
some equivalent scale. Each voter's voting power is normalized, each
rating is divided by the sum of the absolute values of the ratings so that
each voter has a voting power of 1.0
James Gilmour wrote:
49 ACB
48 BCA
3 CBA
[and expressed doubts about whether the public would accept a voting system
that chose C as the winner]
What I see here is a highly polarized electorate. The A-first voters place
B last, and vice versa. Both A-first and B-first voters consider C to
Curt Siffert [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
Honestly, though, I don't believe the 3/49/48 scenario would ever
happen in a political election. For a candidate to have gathered
enough support to even compete in an election, he or she would have to
have a significant amount of first-place supporters.
I would like to submit to the consideration of the EM list a paper that
I've written recently in connection with election methods.
I have made it available in
http://mat.uab.es/~xmora/articles/iss2Aen.pdf .
The paper is not motivated by political elections, but by dancesport
competitions.
James Gilmour wrote:
49 ACB
48 BCA
3 CBA
[and expressed doubts about whether the public would accept a
voting system that chose C as the winner]
What I see here is a highly polarized electorate. The
A-first voters place B last, and vice versa. Both A-first
and B-first voters
Curt Siffert [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
Honestly, though, I don't believe the 3/49/48 scenario would ever
happen in a political election. For a candidate to have gathered
enough support to even compete in an election, he or she
would have to
have a significant amount of first-place
In the EM presidential poll that we voted on in February and March of this
year, Nader won the Approval count.
Nader was the only candidate to receive Approval votes from everyone who
voted.
Nader pairwise-beat his 3 main Approval runners-up (Kucinich, Chomsky
Camejo), and probably everyone.
Hi everyone,
After making repeated attempts to contact Yahoo, with no response, I'm
shutting down the Yahoo Groups access to the election-methods-list.
A little background, as I remember it (I may have some of the details
wrong). Back in 1998, findmail.com started archiving this mailing list,
Jobst--
As I say in the subject-line, this is just a quick preliminary reply:
You wrote:
I wonder whether I understand the NES stuff right. Let me consider a
very simple example: 3 options A,B,C, 3 voters, sincere preferences are
complete and strict rankings, base method is plurality.
I reply:
Ok,
The question was:
Who is A's proxy in an A-B-C-A loop?
A is out of luck, if that's all the information there is.
But you suggested that voters might have also indicated a ranking of
proxies.
Yes, I suggested two ways of doing it:
1. The voter V indicates a ranking of proxies, so that if hir 1st
Curt Siffert wrote:
The flaw to other schemes that I keep bumping my head against is that
proportional representation disenfranchises the people below the cutoff
point, even though their views might still be valuable. But DD by itself
isn't good either because it just gets so unwieldy in the
Ken Johnson wrote:
As
I understand it, the main problem with CR is that it is strategically
equivalent to Approval.
I reply:
That might be a problem to those who don't like Approval. But to those of us
who like Approval, CR's strategic equivalence to Approval isn't a problem.
It's what makes CR
Brian Olson--
You probably have written a better method than IRV.
You wrote:
Instant Runoff Normalized Ratings
(IRNR)
Every voter casts a rating of each choice on a scale of -1.0 to 1.0 or
some equivalent scale. Each voter's voting power is normalized, each
rating is divided by the sum of the
James Gilmour wrote:
Now consider:
49 ACB
48 BCA
3 CBA
IRV winner = B; CW winner = C.
I doubt very much whether most electors would accept C as the winner
if this were an election for State Governor, much less for a directly
elected President of the USA. If anyone has evidence to
Now consider:
49 ACB
48 BCA
3 CBA
IRV winner = B; CW winner = C.
I doubt very much whether most electors would accept C as the winner
if this were an election for State Governor, much less for a directly
elected President of the USA. If anyone has evidence to the contrary I'd
like
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