Ken Johnson wrote:
Bart,
Here's a link to #597,
http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2004-April/012689.html
(Search the text for num_candidate=10.)
Thanks. In your 10 candidate, 1 issue trial, are you able to account
for why sincere CR, exaggerated CR,
Bart Ingles wrote:
The usual sincere strategy is to approve
all candidates where CR is greater than the mean CR of all candidates.
I'm not sure if that was clear. In other words, if a voter assigns a CR
of -0.4, 0.2, and 0.9 to each of three candidates in a 3-way election,
the voter
Hallo,
Tideman suggests to take successively the strongest pairwise
defeat XY and to lock it in its original direction X Y
if it does not create a directed cycle with already locked
pairwise defeats and in its opposite direction Y X otherwise.
The winner of Tideman's ranked pairs method is
Date: Wed, 19 May 2004 23:24:29 -0700
From: Bart Ingles [EMAIL PROTECTED]
... In your 10 candidate, 1 issue trial, are you able to account
for why sincere CR, exaggerated CR, Condorcet, Borda, IRV, and Plurality
all yield exactly the same average across 100,000 elections? It looks
like top-two
Not only is SSFC attainable at that price, but so is this more ambitious
criterion:
Strong Sincere Strategy Criterion (SSSC):
If a majorilty prefer X to Y, and vote sincerely, then Y shouldn't win.
[end of SSSC definition]
Here's a method that meets SCCC and SFCC (any method that meets SSSC
A Weaker SSFC:
If, instead of saying that if the majority preferring the CW to Y vote
sincerely, then Y should lose, we could say that that majority has a sincere
way of voting that ensures that Y will lose. That makes the criterion easy
to meet.
In fact, if we make it that easy, we don't even
Bart had said:
... In your 10 candidate, 1 issue trial, are you able to account
for why sincere CR, exaggerated CR, Condorcet, Borda, IRV, and Plurality
all yield exactly the same average across 100,000 elections? It looks
like top-two Runoff is within 0.1% of the same score.
I think it's simply
On May 20, 2004, at 6:03 PM, MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
Here's a conceptual example that I think better illustrates the problem
that I observed. Suppose you vote in an election in which there are 6
candidates and you have no idea how anyone else votes. Your sincere CR
profile for candidates A ... F is
On May 20, 2004, at 4:46 PM, Ken Johnson wrote:
Date: Wed, 19 May 2004 23:24:29 -0700
From: Bart Ingles [EMAIL PROTECTED]
... In your 10 candidate, 1 issue trial, are you able to account
for why sincere CR, exaggerated CR, Condorcet, Borda, IRV, and
Plurality
all yield exactly the same average
Clarification:
Here's what I think of as a single-issue trial:
Assume a single (unnamed) issue, in which any voter or candidate can
take a position pro or con. You have 3 candidates (A, B, and C) who are
at positions +.7, +.2, -.5. You also have a number of voters who each
can be placed
Bolson--
I'd said:
If you do anything other than mutliplying all of a particular voter's
ratings by the same factor, then you'll get something that's meaningless.
You replied:
I think the operation being applied to each rating of a voter is
f(r) = m * r + b
That's what I assumed was meant too,
I agree with most of what you said. Condorcet is the easy-voting method.
Little or no need for any kind of strategy. Just rank sincerely, as we did
in the recent EM poll.
It's true that IRV has strategy problems that will sometimes be serious.
Approval isn't so difficult. Its strategy is no
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