Hi folks!
Just to repeat myself: We must consider NON-DETERMINISTIC methods like ROACC (see my
post on the recommendations thread) since they are THE ONLY methods which ensure at
least weak group strategy equilibria (weak GSE, i.e. a situation in which there is a
counter-threat to every
Steve Eppley wrote:
Dave K wrote:
AND, they express dislike for Condorcet by their example voting
procedure for preferential voting - the procedure shared by IRV
and Condorcet.
I doubt their omission of Condorcet was an expression of
dislike for Condorcet. Remember, that section was written
Adam T wrote:
Steve Eppley wrote:
-snip-
Right, we're defining Condorcet as a family of voting
procedures that accept preference orders from the voters
and elect the Condorcet winner, if there is one, given
those votes.
So... really, this is Condorcet. Condorcet just means
a voting
Isn't there really anyone interrested in this topic
?
Or amIjust much too confusing in my
explanations ???
I'd like to get feedback on this topic,
please...
It's about normalising the enthropy (amount of
information)
contained in of an "approval like"
vote.
Philippe Errembault
-
As I understand it, your scheme, unlike regular approval, fails the
Favorite Betrayal Criterion (FBC). Suppose there is a close race between
two major candidates, call them Bush and Kerry. Suppose a voter has a
favorite that is neither Bush nor Kerry. In regular approval, a rational
voter will
Jobst wrote in part...
... as there is no
sincere CW (which is quite probable as we know!). This is because
whatever candidate A gets elected, there is always a majority
prefering some B who can elect B by voting B all others without
there being any counter-strategy to this threat.
I am
On Wed, 25 Aug 2004, [iso-8859-1] Anthony Duff wrote:
I am interested in the question of the frequency of non-existance of
a sincere CW. I personally do not know that it is probable.
Here are two scenarios where the classic 3-voter 3-candidate Condorcet
cycle arises naturally. They are both
