James Green-Armytage wrote:
Am I correct in observing that Schwartz // SC-WMA is similar to completing
Condorcet with Schwartz and then Bucklin? How does the former differ from
the latter?
my best,
James
CB: Bucklin hopelessly fails Clone Independence, and so (according to EMR)
is
To me it makes no sense to have a cyclic individual preference. I at least
can take comfort in knowing that Condorcet considered it non-rational (because
he considered the fact that collective preferences can have this quality to be
a paradox)
>From a pragmatic point of view, I think it is jus
I like the more narrow definition better. I like this definition of
"plurality" from Merriam-Webster:
"an amount or group (as of votes) that is greater than any other amount or
group within a total but that is not more than half". I think that it's
helpful to distinguish "plurality" from "majority"
Hello everybody,
I am getting confused. I always thought that plurality
voting was an election where given a multitude of
candidate, the voter could only choose one. (Am I right so
far?)
For me, first-past-the-post (single winner plurality
voting), runoff voting (two rounds plurality voting
Last post on this subject for me for the time being. We're well
into the glue factory stage.
Paul Kislanko wrote:
The
assumption that my second choice for first would be the second on my
ranked ballot IF I HAD KNOWN THAT MY FIRST CHOICE WASN T AVAILABLE is not
warranted,
I think the disagreement
From:
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Alex Small
Sent: Monday, September 06, 2004
7:46 PM
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: [EM] Re: Election-methods
Digest, Vol 3, Issue 18
Paul Kislanko wrote:
>Prove that you can infer my pair-wise choices
As I explained in my original note, A is anti-abortion, pro-gun control,
anti-capital punishment. B is pro-choice, pro-gun control, and anti-capital
punishment. E is anti-abortion, but anti-gun control and pro-capital
punishment. If A, B and E are all choices, I rank A (3 of 3) > B (2 of 3)
and E (
Alex Small <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
>OK, well, let's sit down and chat. I say to you "Paul, which candidate
>do you most want to win?" You ponder it and then you give me an answer.
>If you don't then you haven't made up your mind and you won't be voting
>in this election. Or at least I assum
Paul Kislanko wrote:
>Prove that you can infer my pair-wise choices from my ranked ballot, if you>want to use my ranked ballot to populate a pair-wise matrix.>>It can't be done. So just allow the voters to explicitly input their pair-wise preferences.>
>This is not rocket science.
Um, OK.
Let's t
The proof is of course impossible, but
Given a voter's sincere preference for A>B>E when A, B, C, D and E are
alternatives, and the voter's sincere preference E>B when A is not included
as an alternative,
Why does the inclusion or exclusion of A change the relative position of E
and B?
Elect
Given a voter's sincere preference for A>B>E when A, B, C, D and E are
alternatives, and the voter's sincere preference E>B when A is not included
as an alternative, derive from the ballot
A>B>C>D>E
the sincere preferences A>B, A>E and E>B.
In other words, justify the translation from ranked bal
OK, I give up. This board is too hard to use and there's no one on it who
cares about any opinion but their own.
Y'all have a nice life, but don't expect any of us real people to adopt any
of your proposals.
-Original Message-
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf O
Paul,
Perhaps I'm mistaken, but I don't think that you are genuinely replying
to many of the messages which you are ostensibly replying to. In this
case, you continue to speak about axiology when my post was about
addressing practical problems. Hence, it's a non-reply.
Sincerely,
James
A few more thoughts on the matter:
I've heard some plausible arguments for why a person might prefer A to B when those are the only 2 choices, and prefer B to C when those are the only 2 choices, but prefer C to A when those are the only 2 choices.
Fine. Some might think it's irrational, other
Am I correct in observing that Schwartz // SC-WMA is similar to completing
Condorcet with Schwartz and then Bucklin? How does the former differ from
the latter?
my best,
James
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Only problem is no one has made a case against Jobst's original suggestion
that any method that depends upon pair-wise comparisons should allow
pair-wise input.
The "social choice" theorists only say "I don't like them" and there's no
argument against that.
Prove that you can infer my pair-wise
The case for allowing cyclic ballots doesn't seem very compelling to me,
but if there were no drawbacks to it (no case against it), then I would be
in favor of allowing them.
So, for those who seek to advocate ballots which accommodate cyclic
individual preferences, I suggest that
See below.
-Original Message-
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of
Adam Tarr
Sent: Monday, September 06, 2004 5:50 PM
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [EM] Cycles in sincere individual preferences
At 10:34 PM 9/6/2004 +0200, Jobst Heitzig wrote:
>Just a summa
>
>Here's a first, very simple and perhaps too simple version of a method
>which distinguishes between more and less important binary preferences:
Dear Jobst,
This proposal reminds me a bit of a version of weighted pairwise which I
proposed on June 19th, where people assign a value to the
At 10:34 PM 9/6/2004 +0200, Jobst Heitzig wrote:
Just a summary of my opinions (in case anyone misunderstood):
1. Incomplete or even individual prefs are no problem for most methods.
Most Condorcet methods, yes. They are pretty meaningless for IRV, Borda,
and most other non-pairwise methods.
2.
" Give one vote for the top candidate(s) over every lower candidate(s).
Scratch off the top candidate(s)
repeat until the ballot is exhausted.
What else is there to prove...?"
Well, not sure what you "proved", but as you described it either you elected
the losing-est candidate or you said Borda w
>The reason I wouldn't have chosen E over B, C, or D on a ranked
ballot
>with A as an alternative is that B, C, D "trumped" E on
every issue that
>was not the single one that A&E agreed upon.
And yet, you already stated you would prefer E pairwise over any of
the
three. So why, oh why, woul
Warren Schudy wrote:
>Do you believe that cycles in personal preferences are rational when the>preferences aren't used for voting? For example, would you consider it>rational to prefer having an apple to an orange to a pear to an apple? >(No voting, just which would you prefer to buy if they had th
Dear James!
Here's a first, very simple and perhaps too simple version of a method
which distinguishes between more and less important binary preferences:
Each voter answers pairwise comparisons with the possible answers "A>>B"
(strong preference), "A>B" (weak preference), "A=B"
(equivalence/ind
AMEN!
-Original Message-
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of
Jobst Heitzig
Sent: Monday, September 06, 2004 3:34 PM
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [EM] Cycles in sincere individual preferences
Just a summary of my opinions (in case anyone misunderstood):
1
Just a summary of my opinions (in case anyone misunderstood):
1. Incomplete or even individual prefs are no problem for most methods.
2. Whether some set of individual prefs is rational or logical doesn't
matter.
3. We should not restrict freedom of preference expression without need.
4. Method
Hello,
Oops! (again). I have discovered that one of the criterion
compliances I claimed for Schwartz:// Symetrically Completed-
Weighted Median Approval was wrong.
Voters rank the candidates, truncation ok. Non-last equal prefernces
also ok (but a version that doesn't allow them is also good
Do you believe that cycles in personal preferences are rational when the
preferences aren't used for voting? For example, would you consider it
rational to prefer having an apple to an orange to a pear to an apple?
(No voting, just which would you prefer to buy if they had the same
price). The an
“1) While one
could complain that disallowing cyclic preferences unnecessarily restricts a
voter's freedom of choice, somebody else could complain that using ordinal
preferences instead of cardinal ratings restricts freedom of _expression_.
A voting method has to impose some type of simpl
" Give one vote for the top candidate(s) over every lower candidate(s).
Scratch off the top candidate(s)
repeat until the ballot is exhausted.
What else is there to prove...?"
Well, not sure what you "proved", but as you described it either you elected
the losing-est candidate or you said Borda w
In a message dated 9/6/2004 1:48:49 PM Central Standard Time,
[EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
Paul
Kislanko wrote:>The reason I wouldn't have chosen E over B, C, or D
on a ranked ballot >with A as an alternative is that B, C, D "trumped"
E on every issue that >was not the single one that A&E
This discussion of transitive preferences brings 3 thoughts to mind:
1) While one could complain that disallowing cyclic preferences unnecessarily restricts a voter's freedom of choice, somebody else could complain that using ordinal preferences instead of cardinal ratings restricts freedom of _
I'm not sure why this was put in as a second message, but anyway...
Paul Kislanko wrote:
If you do not believe an individual should be allowed to think, you should
not be worried about voting methods.
I certainly don't have a problem with folks having whatever opinions they
like. But social choi
Paul Kislanko wrote:
The reason I wouldn't have chosen E over B, C, or D on a ranked ballot
with A as an alternative is that B, C, D "trumped" E on every issue that
was not the single one that A&E agreed upon.
And yet, you already stated you would prefer E pairwise over any of the
three. So why
“But I do NOT believe
that an individual can have such preferences. Or, more accurately, an
individual may have such preferences, but I do not consider them logical, and I
have absolutely no interest in factoring such preferences into a social choice
algorithm.”
If you do not believe a
In a message dated 9/6/2004 1:06:38 PM Central Standard Time,
[EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
But
I do NOT believe that an individual can have such preferences. Or, more
accurately, an individual may have such preferences, but I do not consider
them logical, and I have absolutely no intere
Paul Kislanko wrote:
Suppose I
were a staunch pro-life believer, so anti-abortion is my most important
criterion. There are 5 candidates in the race, and A & E are both
anti-abortion, but have opposite views on gun control (A for, E against)
and capital punishment (A against, E for). B, C, and D a
Evidently examples matter more than logic, so here’s
one last try in support of Jobst’s argument that pairwise counting
methods should have a pairwise collection method.
Suppose I were a staunch “pro-life” believer, so
“anti-abortion” is my most important criterion. There are 5
candidat
Dear Craig Carey,
you wrote (6 Sep 2004):
> MR SCHULZE was showing real ruthlessness to me at the times
> I asked for information on how he created the "X over Y"
> subtotal. I still DO NOT HAVE MR SCHULZE's algorithm: MR
> SCHULZE was censoring out the same part that MR HEITZIG
> was not commenti
At 2004-09-05 22:57 +0200 Sunday, Jobst Heitzig wrote:
...
>. It is a
>trivial task to design a ballot in which the voter can choose to either:
> (i) mark one candidate as first choice or several as the top set, or
That could extend the rules to the Block vote (k marks for k winners)
>
>I hope your not angry on me since I argue so fiercly against ratings.
No, I'm not angry. Disagreement does not necessitate anger for me. I'm
glad that you are still interested in cooperation.
>I still agree with you that preferences can have different "strengths"
>which we could try t
At 2004-09-05 15:47 +0200 Sunday, Jobst Heitzig wrote:
>James,
>
>> I think that this is silly,
>
>Don't expect me to appreciate that... If I would think something someone
>says on this list is silly (for example making unneccessary assumptions
>about preferences) I would certainly not post
42 matches
Mail list logo
