Hello James
You wrote:
Any comments? Any suggestions for alternative methods for proportional ordering? Keep in mind that this procedure does not entail the massive computational cost of an ordinary CPO-STV tally, because the vast majority of possible outcomes are excluded from consideration.
Hello friends,
I conducted a little secret poll with an organization in Quebec.
We wanted to establish our priorities subjet order.
Nine persons filled preferential ballots, I would like
to know a site where I can solve this.
I am searching for the best internet available program that
would
Paul,
--- Paul Kislanko [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
The situation is a truncated ballot one: the task is to pick the top 25
teams from a field of 117, so no one can vote for more than 25. I realize
that a better approach to this would be full ranked ballots and some form of
PR-STV,
If you
Thanks very much. Let me clarify my question...
Which approach is right?
The only non-PR way I can think to do IRV to obtain a ranking of the
candidates is to
1. find the IRV winner
2. delete him from all the ballots as though he hadn't been an option
3. repeat.
This seems like too
Paul,
--- Paul Kislanko [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
The method you describe is interesting, though. In the single-winner
case, it seems equivalent to Plurality.
It is almost like plurality plus run-offs, because a team doesn't get ranked
x until a majority vote it higher than all
Jobst's recent postings about complaints and their rebuttals, and short
ranked pairs has led me to the following Approval Condorcet hybrid:
Ballots are ordinal with approval cutoff, equal rankings allowed.
Let U(A) be the set of uncovered candidates that cover the approval winner
A. The member
I've mentioned Condorcet completed by IRV in recent posts as a possible
bridge from IRV to more advanced Condorcet methods such as cardinal
pairwise. I suggested something like the following progression for
single-winner elections
1. plurality/runoffs
2. equal-ranking IRV (fractional)
3.
James G-A,
You wrote (Thu.Dec.9,04):
Am I correct in thinking that this meets the criteria mentioned above?
Does this seem like a sensible way to do IRV-completed Condorcet in
general?
My answer to your first question is that it seems to me that it does,
and it also seems to meet
Thank you very much! That is exactly the answer I was looking for, and
confimed my experience with playing around with it.
Ah, I get it. This isn't like IRV so much as Bucklin. That is
definitely
an easier way to go. With IRV, in the above scenario, only
the votes for
second of the 9 C
