Dear James Green-Armytage,
please read:
1) chapter Super-Majorities of http://www.condorcet.org/rp/details.shtml
2) appendix 5 of
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/election-methods-list/files/schulze1.zip
Markus Schulze
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list
I'm sure that Kevin has given more thought to this example than I have,
but it just occured to me that C cannot win under approval no matter where
the third faction members place their approval cutoffs, whether above,
below, or equal to B. Since C can never win (under approval) the best
As Jobst recently pointed out, non-deterministic methods have not been
adequately studied or promoted, considereing their potential contribution
to fairness and to strategy free voting.
Consider, for example the following cycle of three:
34 ABC
33 BCA
33 CAB
Though most methods would give
Forest Simmons wrote:
As Jobst recently pointed out, non-deterministic methods have
not been
adequately studied or promoted, considereing their potential
contribution
to fairness and to strategy free voting.
Consider, for example the following cycle of three:
34 ABC
33 BCA
Forest Simmons wrote:
What if we tossed two coins, and gave the win to B if they both came up
heads, to C if they both came up tails, and to A otherwise.
Wouldn't a random cycle-breaker provide strong incentive for a sure
loser in a cycle-free election to try to create a cycle?
Bart
This is James Green-Armytage replying to Markus Schulze.
Dear James Green-Armytage,
please read:
1) chapter Super-Majorities of http://www.condorcet.org/rp/details.shtml
2) appendix 5 of
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/election-methods-list/files/schulze1.zip
Markus Schulze
Dear Markus,
