[EM] Re: MMPO, Majority, Condorcet failures (Raynaud versions)
Chris Benham chrisbenham
at bigpond.com
Wed Dec 29 11:33:31 PST 2004
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30 A, 30 A=B, 40 C>B>A example
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sprucing up
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Chris Benham wrote Wed.Dec.29:
49: A
24: B
27: C>B
A>C 49-27 (m 22)
C>B 27-24 (m 3)
B>A 51-49 (m 2)
The three versions each give a different winner. PO eliminates A and
elects C, failing Plurality.
GL eliminates B and elects C, failing Minimal Defense. Margins
eliminates C and elects B
On Tue, 28 Dec 2004, Forest Simmons wrote:
Here are two analogous questions concerning a cycle in which A beats C beats
B beats A:
3000 A
3000 A=B
4000 B>C
(1) Suppose that A, B, and C represent parties, and that based on these
ballots, we are supposed to allocate 100 seats in congress to the pa
From: Forest Simmons <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: election-methods-electorama.com@electorama.com
Subject: non-determinism and PR.
From: Bart Ingles <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: [EM] non-deterministic methods
...
Wouldn't a random cycle-breaker provide strong incentive for a sure
loser in a cycle-fre
Date: Tue, 28 Dec 2004 13:40:07 -0800
From: Ted Stern <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: [EM] Re: Sprucing up MMPO and other methods
...
I have a question about the first stage, eliminating covered candidates:
On 21 Dec 2004 at 16:09 PST, Forest Simmons wrote:
1. Eliminate covered candidates until each
Forest,
--- Forest Simmons <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> The example in the subject line is a good example with a "Futile Approval
> Candidate" C in the mix.
> A Futile Approval Candidate is one that would never win under approval
> even if the approval cutoff were placed immediately under
Gervase,
On Tues.Dec.21 you wrote:
Monotonicity to me seems to be a very fundamental requirement for ranked
election methods. If I had to choose between Clone Independence and
Monotonicity, but not both, then I think I would go for Monotonicity.
Why? I live in Australia, where IRV's fail
