Yesterday I came across a series of interesting papers on Range voting
written by Warren D.Smith. Those interested see the papers under the title
56. Range Voting on http://math.temple.edu/~wds/homepage/works.html
a.. TITLE: Range Voting
b.. abstract;
c.. ps file (28 pages); pdf;
d..
In this example, Borda, IRV and Margins go with C, while wv and Bucklin
say B.
Besides this disagreement, there is the problem that if the win is given
to B for this ballot set, then if the 24 faction voters' true preferences
were BAC, they would be sorely tempted to truncate so that B would
Someone wrote:
eing able to express ratings on a ballot is more expressive than only
being able to express rankings. I think more expressive is a good
thing.
On the back end, we could silently collapse the ratings into rankings
by sorting the candidates, then apply Condorcet, IRV, etc.
I reply:
Thanks to Mike Ossipoff and Jurij Toplak for their very
helpful comments about range voting. I asked about it
a couple of weeks ago. Unless someone would like to
challenge Mike's favorable comments, I'm planning to
include range voting as one of the major alternatives to
plurality voting and IRV
