Hi folks,
With the Mailman software we're using for this mailing list, it's a
fairly easy exercise for me to go though the queue of email that gets
sent to the list from non-list members. The bad news is that I'm still
falling down on the job. I let 156 messages stack up from the beginning
of
> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Subject: [EM] Is range voting the panacea we need?
> To: election-methods-electorama.com@electorama.com
> Message-ID: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="US-ASCII"
>
> Will someone on the list who has studied range voting and compared it to
> Condo
First I have a typo correction in my example (inspired by Bart) showing
that ordinal ballot methods satisfying neutrality and the Condorcet
Criterion are manipulable, even when non-deterministic.
I gave the last faction as z C>B>A, when I meant z C>A>B. The entire
corrected tableaux is
x
Dear Jobst,
Yes, it does sound like an intriguing idea, although non-deterministic
methods have never been an area of expertise for me.
In its present state, the proposal is still a little bit too abstract
for
me to grasp; as usual, it's easier for me to understand a tally metho
On 5 Jan 2005 at 15:15 PST, Forest Simmons wrote:
>
snip
>
> Ted Stern gets the credit for finding an efficient sprucing up procedure
> by finding an existing clone collapsing algorithm in the literature.
another snip
>
> Here is Lottery in the form of Spruced Up Random Ballot:
>
This looks like another way of doing Spruced Up Random Candidate.
In particular, properties 7 and 8 below correspond to the first two steps
of the "Spruce Up" process. Because of this, Spruced Up Lottery has to be
equivalent to Lottery. And then properties 5 and 6 finish the
characterization o
Before the effects of "strategic" vs. "sincere" voting in
elections using Approval Voting (AV) or Range Voting (RV)
can be adequately assessed, there needs to be more clarity
about what the best strategies really are or how they
can be arrived at by voters wanting to maximize the impact
of their vo
Forest Simmons ("sprucing up") and Jobst Heitzig (Short Ranked Pairs), among
others, have posted Condorcet completion methods that involve searching for a
winner from among the uncovered set of candidates.
What are the special properties of the uncovered set? Are they worth shooting
for, even if
Dear folks!
Reading again Laslier's book, I stumbled upon a method which proves to be very
promising after close inspection.
It is based on the simple fact that when comparing lotteries of candidates
instead of the candidates alone,
there is always a "Condorcet Winner" among the lotteries!
Acco
James--
You wrote:
Range voting is neither a majority rule method...
I reply:
That depends on what you mean by a majority-rule method. You define it below
as a Smith-Criterion method, but you mustn't expect others to share that
definition. Range-Voting, which I call CR, meets WDSC, which says:
I
By the way, when I said that my definition of sincerity for criteria doesn't
mention ratings, I _didn't_ mean that it doesn't apply to CR. It applies to
all methods, as do my criteria. But it refers to voting pairwise
preferences, by voting one candidate over another, which, by the definition
o
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