Ralph, you objected to the term "pseudomajority methods" for
non-majoritarian single-winner methods, on the grounds that it was too
derogatory. So, how about "plurality methods" instead? This is appropriate
for methods like approval, range, and Borda, because what matter is who
has the highest cum
Ralph,
You disagreed with my use of the derogatory term "pseudomajority" for
approval voting, and I can sympathize with you there, but I'm disappointed
to note that your response doesn't touch on the major points that I made
in the post that you are replying to, and therefore I wonder whe
>Date: Sat, 08 Jan 2005 07:42:29 -0800
>From: "Michael A. Rouse" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>Subject: [EM] Question/Strategic Approval Voting
Mike wrote:
>I've been bouncing back and forth between Range and Approval voting for
>the past couple of days, trying to see how each is affected by
strategy
Mike,
--- MIKE OSSIPOFF <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> [Chris] continued:
>
> Obviously if the method doesn't collect enough information to infer the
> voters' favourites, then it can't meet MF.
>
> I reply:
>
> No, if a method didn't allow us to indicate a favorite, then it would pass,
>
> On 7 Jan 2005 at 17:41 PST, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> >> A third point is that there is no way for Proportional Representation
to be
> >> implemented until the legislative process can be scaled up (fairly and
> >> openly) to 500, 1000 or 1 representatives. This is a deep issue.
> >
Pure PR
IRV advocates again, on the opinion page in today's Seattle Times:
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/opinion/2002146615_szwaja10.html
Ted
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Send real replies to
ted stern at u dot washington dot edu
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Election-methods mailin
On 7 Jan 2005 at 17:41 PST, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>> A third point is that there is no way for Proportional Representation to be
>> implemented until the legislative process can be scaled up (fairly and
>> openly) to 500, 1000 or 1 representatives. This is a deep issue.
>
> It could be impl
In a message dated 1/10/05, [EMAIL PROTECTED]
wrote:
> Pseudomajority methods: Plurality, approval, range voting,
> Borda
It seems to me that you are substituting rhetoric for
analysis here. "Pseudo" means false, and approval simply
does not deserve to be lumped in with plurality as a
method that