Re: [EM] Re: Approval/Condorcet Hybrids

2005-01-19 Thread Ted Stern
On 11 Jan 2005 at 14:40 PST, Jobst Heitzig wrote: >> >> But ... your argument that, if W differs from A, this implies "that W >> beat every candidate that A beats head to head" does not follow. It >> only implies that W has highest approval in U(A). > > No, Forest is right, he defined: >>> Let U(

[EM] How Approval locks on to the CW in two or three moves.

2005-01-19 Thread Forest Simmons
Let's suppose that there are three candidates, and that one of them C is preferred over the other two by fifty percent plus majorities (not just by more for than against). Suppose that candidate X (not equal to C) is the perceived front runner going into the first election. Then strategic vote

Re: [EM] Another method idea

2005-01-19 Thread Forest Simmons
Daniel Bishop wrote: >Forest Simmons wrote: > >> Ballots are ordinal rankings or cardinal ratings. >> >> Any candidate with more than average first place rankings or ratings >> gets a point. Any candidate with fewer than average last place (or >> truncated) rankings or ratings gets a point

Source of claim that imagination is wanted (was Re: [EM] James: Approval & voter median

2005-01-19 Thread Craig Carey
The disclosure below, of using imagination instead of reasoning, is something that I was assuming that Mr OSSIPOFF did Below the text of OSSIPOFF claims that Mr Paielli said he preferred to use imahination. I checked the e-mails and Mr Paielli did not say what Mr OSSIPOFF had said he did. I gu

[EM] James: Approval & voter median

2005-01-19 Thread MIKE OSSIPOFF
Again I neglected to write down the subject line so that I could post with the same subject line. James-- I'd said: Approval quickly homes in on the voter median, and then stays there. Condorcet goes directly to the voter median in its 1st election. Approval & CR do so in thei r 2nd election. Tha