Forest Simmons simmonfo-at-up.edu |EMlist| wrote:
From: Russ Paielli <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
So what is the optimal strategy in responding to an Approval poll? Do
any or all voters have an incentive to lie about their cutoff point --
or perhaps to even rearrange their preference order before drawing t
Craig Carey research-at-ijs.co.nz |EMlist| wrote:
I shall quit this mailing list immediately after writing this, to get away from
some people here:
* the arrogant idtio and liar, "MIKE OSSIPOFF";
* the 'Less than Zero' student with too much that is dishonest to say,
Mr Green-Armytage, an
> Date: Wed, 02 Feb 2005 18:45:15 -0800
> From: Russ Paielli
> Subject: Re: [EM] Comparative Effectiveness of Approval and Condorcet
> in the case of a three candidate cycle.
> I've already brought up the issue of inaccurate polling data, and I
> think the effect of such uncertainty needs t
Dear Craig Carey,
you wrote (4 Feb 2005):
> IFPP satisfied many types of Woodall's monotonicity
> since it is Truncation Resistant too.
Your IFPP method violates:
mono-raise
mono-raise-random
mono-raise-delete
mono-add-top
mono-add-plump
mono-remove-bottom
mono-sub-top
mono-sub-p
I told Mr Schulze that he was all wrong about 4 candidate IFPP, 20 hours
47 minutes before he made public the same wrong ideas.
The explanation is that Mr Schulze says he is talking about IFPP and he is
not. IFPP satisfied many types of Woodall's monotonicity since it is
Truncation Resistant too
From: Russ Paielli <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: [EM] Comparative Effectiveness of Approval and Condorcet
in the case of a three candidate cycle.
Yes, Approval does have some nice properties under the ideal conditions
of DSV, but let me play "devil's advocate" again and bring up some
"
Date: Wed, 2 Feb 2005 14:45:57 -0800 (PST)
From: Rob LeGrand <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: [EM] Re: simulating an Approval campaign/election
Forest wrote:
Actually, DSV with Strategy A can sometimes converge to a stable
equilibrium even when there is no Condorcet Winner:
4900 C
2400 B
2700 A>B
Rob r
