> This sounds somewhat promising. Can you cite any sources on the
> mathematically unsolvable nature of this problem, or expand on that a
> little bit?
This is a technical topic but optimization problems of this type are
computationally NP hard to solve.
Doing this would be radical departure from
Here's an idea to stimulate thought:
Ballots are Cardinal Ratings or Ordinal Rankings. Approval cutoffs are
optional. Some default scheme is used for ballots that do not have
indicated approval cutoffs.
If there is a CW, the winner is chosen by random ballot among all of the
candidates that h
Unfortunately, it doesn't matter whether there's a good way to do
redristicting or not, because the US Constitution says that a state
legislature can do it however they want, and left to themselves the party in
control of the legislature will avoid at all costs the "best" way to do it
(see Texas, w
I consider Mike's recent posting under the above subject heading to be
very thoughtful and a good summary of some of our common interests and
where we are currently in our quest to find methods that are in line with
those interests.
Regarding "wv between all possible lotteries" (a small part of
Matt?:
This sounds somewhat promising. Can you cite any sources on the mathematically
unsolvable nature of this problem, or expand on that a little bit?
Thank you very much,
SB
- Original Message --
Date: Mon, 21 Feb 2005 21:31:40 -0500 (EST)
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: [EM] Theoreti
I´d said:
Many strategies can be related to Weber's strategy of voting for candidates
with positive strategic value, according to Weber's strategic value formula.
But that doesn't make them the same strategy, as we've been using the term
here. Only Russ claims that to vote for whichever of the
On 20 Feb 2005 at 10:21 PST, Bart Ingles wrote:
> Sorry, I didn't read the original proposal carefully enough to see that
> it was intended as a type of non-partisan blanket primary.
>
> Open or blanket primaries make it easier to engage in pushover strategy,
> where one party tries to make sure
I forgot to include all the wording that I intended for the equilibrium
criteria:
And a different naming might be good too.
Falsifyingness:
A method is falsifying if, with that method, there are situations
(configurations of candidates and voter preferences) in which there is a CW,
and there a
