Markus said:
I said that criteria should be defined on the
_cast_ preferences and not on the _sincere_
preferences.
I didn't say that criteria shouldn't
be defined on preferences at all.
I reply:
A vote isn´t a preference. A vote might be based on a preference, though
often it is not. If a vote
Markus--
You said:
I wrote (27 Feb 2005):
So you say that it is impossible to define WDSC, SDSC,
and FBC in terms of cast preferences?
You wrote (27 Feb 2005):
Either it's impossible, or else no one has yet succeeded.
Does it matter which it is?
Yes, it does matter. Election methods are defined on
Russ,
In my last post in this thread, I wrote:
"A more useful criterion is the normal (as
opposed to Mike-style)
criterion taken from Blake Cretney's website:
Name: Secret Preferences Criterion: SPC
Application: Ranked ballots
Definition:
If alternative X wins, and some of
Kevin said:
I think, in short, that the situation (of odds distribution)
is not relevant to FBC.
I reply:
Ok, now I know what Markus meant by situation. He meant an outcome that is
a lottery.
There are 2 answers to Markus´s question, depending on whether we call his
lotteries the outcomes, or
Dear Mike,
I wrote (27 Feb 2005):
Election methods are defined on _cast_ preferences
and not on _sincere_ preferences. Therefore, whether
a given election method passes a given criterion
must depend only on how this method handles _cast_
preferences. Therefore, a criterion can be well
Dear Mike,
I wrote (28 Feb 2005):
Suppose your sincere preference is ABCDE. Suppose in
situation #1, candidate A is elected with a probability of
60% and candidate B with a probability of 40%. Suppose in
situation #2, candidate A is elected with a probability of
70%, candidate B with a
An interesting item I just read:
http://instapundit.com/archives/021490.php
This illustrates, in a mild way, the reason why totalitarian
regimes collapse so suddenly. . . . Such regimes have little
legitimacy, but they spend a lot of effort making sure that
citizens
On Wed, 2 Mar 2005, Jobst Heitzig wrote:
Dear Forest!
When I understand you right, you propose to just strike out all strongly
covered candidates and then use Random Ballot on the rest, right?
But then there must be some error in your proof of monotonicity, I fear --
look at the following
I´d said:
No, the Condorcet's Criterion that was at the website at the technical
evaluation page was a Mike style criterioni entirely. It referred to the CW
(which you called the IDW, defined as I define the CW), and it stipulated
sincere voting. Both the CW and sincere voting are defined
