On Sat, 12 Mar 2005 15:00:36 -0800 (PST) Alex Small wrote:
I mostly agree with Russ.
Another reason why IRV is popular is that it's basically an expanded and
automated version of an election method already used for many local
elections in the US, as well as elections to some higher offices in
Dear Ted!
You wrote:
At first, I didn't understand what Frest meant by 'transitive, but I gather
what he mans is, start a chain by adding the first candidate from the sorted
list (Call that candidate A_i), to the new chain (call that B_j). When adding
a new candidate, start at the winning
Dear election methods fans,
In a recent message, I noted that there is no broad consensus among
Condorcet supporters as to which completion methods would be most
appropriate for a few key scenarios. I don't really expect to establish
such a consensus, but I would at least like to address
Date: Mon, 7 Mar 2005 10:17:43 -0800 (PST)
From: Alex Small
Subject: [EM] Equal Rankings in Real World Voting Systems
As to whether equal rankings complicate the Approval cutoff, I prefer to
just have separate yes/no boxes by each candidate's name (or even a
separate Approval section of the
In a message dated 3/13/05 3:52:05 AM Eastern Standard Time,
[EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
IRV is much easier to explain than Condorcet, and I believe that
is the primary reason that it is more popular.
Jim Lindsay is probably speaking from experience when he says
that IRV is only somewhat easy to
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
The only problem with IRR is when there is no Condorcet winner.
But as far as I know, elections with no CW are totally theoretical.
For them to happen would require voters to seriously confused
about their preferences for different candidates. Does anyone
know of a single
I strongly urge everyone to get into the habit of calling Condorcet methods
Instand Round Robin (IRR) methods. The Instant Round Robin name is far more
descriptive than Condorcet. I think the concept of a round robin
tournament is widely understood, even among people who are not sports fans.
The
Hi Jan!
You wrote:
I strongly urge everyone to get into the habit of calling Condorcet
methods Instand Round Robin (IRR) methods. The Instant Round Robin
name is far more descriptive than Condorcet.
I'm not so sure, Jan, since many Condorcet-efficient methods do not
require all (n-1)*n/2
Dear Ted!
You wrote:
Thanks to both of your responses, I have an idea now that I think will work,
and it should have (my) desired quality of encouraging generous approval
cutoff and ranking of candidates below the cutoff.
Basically, the idea is simply Beatpath: Break each cycle at the
A few things.
First, I like the point about Instant Round Robin as a name. I think I will start calling it that. Naming something after a theorist is fine in academic circles, but I can't think of too many policies that are widely referred to by the name of some theorist. So I'm cool with the
Jobst Heitzig heitzig-j-at-web.de |EMlist| wrote:
Dear Ted!
You wrote:
Thanks to both of your responses, I have an idea now that I think will work,
and it should have (my) desired quality of encouraging generous approval
cutoff and ranking of candidates below the cutoff.
Basically, the idea is
Dear Alex!
You wrote:
Naming something after a theorist is
fine in academic circles,
There is disagreement about this since it leads too often to the wrong
person getting the credit...
Then somebody wrote:
I'm not so sure, Jan, since many Condorcet-efficient methods do not
require all
If I understand this, Paul is saying that what
Condorcet does is not Round Robin BECAUSE Round Robin in sports only has
ONE match between each pair of teams,
In sport, there are no "cycles" in a round-robin. In a 3-team round-robin
there's only 2-0, 1-1, and 0-2 as possible outcomes for
Actually, all Paul said is that the analogy is not
perfect.
Condorcet methods are "like" as in "similar to" a
round-robin tournament in sport. The analogy is not identical because in sport
there is a well-determined outcome when team A plays team B, namely either A or
B wins.
Where the
OK, maybe Condorcet elections aren't exactly analogous to round robin sports tournaments, butI still want somebody, anybody, to tell me how the winner is determined in a round robin if each of the 3 teams wins one game and loses one game. I've been told that the method of resolution has something
Actually, I addressed this in my original post. In a
sporting tournament involving a 3-team round-robin, the only possible tie for
first is if every team goes 1-1 in the match.
Which team is the winner is based upon an arbirtrary
criterion declared ahead of time by the tournament sponsor.
Markus--
I'd said:
Majority rejected was never a criterion.
Wrong. It was one of your criteria. You called this
criterion Generalized Majority Criterion (GMC).
I reply:
But, in that case, the criterion was GMC, not Majority Rejected.
Anyway, GMC came years after the majority defensive strategy
Markus--
I'd said:
Majority rejected was never a criterion.
Wrong. It was one of your criteria. You called this
criterion Generalized Majority Criterion (GMC).
I reply:
But, in that case, the criterion was GMC, not Majority Rejected.
Anyway, GMC came years after the majority defensive strategy
I said:
Dropping the strongest
defeat that's in a cycle can give diffrerent results from dropping the
weakest
defeat among the members of the current Schwartz set.
I comment:
I meant: Dropping the _weakest_ defeat that's in a cycle...
Mike Ossipoff
James--
You wrote:
[Regarding the choice of a public Condorcet proposal]
There are at least three areas of possible divergence:
1. The base method: Minimax (candidate whose worst loss is least bad),
sequential dropping (drop the weakest defeat that's in a cycle until a
candidate is
I'd said:
That shows what happens when someone uses formulas about whose meaning he
hasn't a clue.
Riuss said:
This from a guy who didn't realize that basing an Approval vote on the
previous election implies voting by party.
I comment:
We've been all over that. If the electorate is similar to
James Green-Armytage jarmyta-at-antioch-college.edu |EMlist| wrote:
Dear election methods fans,
In a recent message, I noted that there is no broad consensus among
Condorcet supporters as to which completion methods would be most
appropriate for a few key scenarios. I don't really expect
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