Dear Mike,
you claimed that you proposed the wv Condorcet class of
methods (25 Feb 2005). David Gamble asked (25 Feb 2005)
whether you really proposed winning votes (wv) methods
first. You replied (26 Feb 2005): I'd proposed the wv
Condorcet methods, and wv Condorcet methods were popular,
long
Russ,
I had written regarding your Ranked Approval proposal:
I think that with pre-polls and strategy, this would usually give the
same result as IRV. In the three-candidate case, I see it only giving
a different result when a lot of voters have a big sincere ratings gap
between their second
Hello Forest,
Least Additional Votes (like Approval) has the advantage (over many
other methods) of being able to tell the losers by how many votes they
missed winning the election.
Yes. Ability to understand what happened in the election is a good
requirement for any election method - not a
Hello James,
I wrote a long mail. Sorry about that. No need to reply on everything
word in it. I however felt that it is worth writing all the text, just
in case it would trigger some useful thoughts. Simple answer thanks
but I'm not convinced of the merits of non-Smith-set candidates yet is
On 15 Mar 2005 at 21:49 PST, Russ Paielli wrote:
I'm just trying strike a balance between simplicity and
effectiveness. I am starting to realize that equal rankings may be
worthwhile. As for allowing ranking past the Approval cutoff point,
I am still not sold on that, but I am open minded.
On 15 Mar 2005 at 21:49 PST, Russ Paielli wrote:
Note
that the simple idea of ranking candidates will stress the limits of
public acceptability all by itself.
I am not certain this is true.
I have watched and continue to track various efforts to get IRV
implemented in various locations around the
Dear Forest!
I consider your post, in which you argue in favour of using Random
Ballot among the set P of candidates which are not strongly beaten by
any other, to be perhaps the most valuable post in the last weeks!
I like that method VERY much: It is quite easily described and
motivated, does
On 15 Mar 2005 at 14:12 PST, Forest Simmons wrote:
Here's my sales pitch (to EM members) for RAV/ARC:
When candidate X beats Y in both approval and by head-to-head choice,
let's say that X strongly beats Y.
If X strongly beats Y then both approval and pairwise methods agree that Y
should
Substantial abbreviation of previous messages.
On 16 Mar 2005 at 15:54 PST, Forest Simmons wrote:
On Wed, 16 Mar 2005, Araucaria Araucana wrote:
On 15 Mar 2005 at 14:12 PST, Forest Simmons wrote:
Here's my sales pitch (to EM members) for RAV/ARC:
When candidate X beats Y in both approval
James,
Thanks for posting your margins example.
While I don't want to commit myself to saying that winning votes is better
for public elections (there could be examples I haven't thought of yet), I
won't be recommending margins for public elections any time soon.
CF
P.S. I'm sorry I've
Date: Tue, 15 Mar 2005 21:49:20 -0800
From: Russ Paielli [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: [EM] Re: Total Approval Ranked Pairs
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Russ worried that putting in an approval cutoff might be too costly.
The cost is the same as adding one extra candidate, the ACC (Approval
Cutoff
Markus--
I replied that it cannot be said that you proposed wv
methods in general because you didn't propose a general
concept.
I reply:
But I did propose a general concept. As I said in my previouis posting
about this, I clearly and unmistakeably introduced and proposed wv as a way
of measuring
Before I read your post I proposed a Madison Avenue style name of
Majority Fair Chance.
It's not very scientific. Perhaps, Fair Chance Democratic Choice would
be better, though still not taxonomically descriptive.
I don't think it has quite enough randomness in it for the tough examples.
Markus--
I replied that it cannot be said that you proposed wv
methods in general because you didn't propose a general
concept.
I reply:
But I did propose a general concept. As I said in my previouis posting
about this, I clearly and unmistakeably introduced and proposed wv as a way
of
Kevin--
You quoted me:
So, a method would satisfy WDSC if the CADEBFG voters, comprising a
majority, could deny B the win by voting C=AD=EB=FG. It isn't necessary
that there be any other way for them to deny B the win.
I replied:
You got it. One is all it takes.
You'd continued:
I think that's
Kevin--
You said:
I meant that a criterion like WDSC should guarantee more. As it is, not only
is it abnormally difficult to verify compliance, but there are silly ways of
satisfying it. Compare my rendition:
I reply:
I've already answered the silly ways of compliance part of that statement,
but:
Eric Gorr wrote:
I found the reason why my counts were different from the official tally
for District 9, but this leads to more confusion on how the ballots were
counted...is anyone more familiar with the IRV counting rules used in SF
then myself?
It would be interesting to know how many
Hello Mike,
Thanks for the comments. I agree with most of the stuff. Few comments
follow.
Best Regards,
Juho
You continued:
This is based on the assumption that strategical voting is not that
easy in real life, at least not in elections where the number of
voters is large.
I reply:
It
Hello James,
As more or less promised, here are some comments on the rest of your
mail.
BR,
Juho
3. Condorcet and strategies
Condorcet is close to a dream come true in the sense that it almost
provides a perfect solution that eliminates all strategies from
elections and frees people to giving
Hi Juho,
My critique of your pro-minimax(margins) argument follows...
I tend to see margins as natural and winning votes as something that
deviates from the more natural margins but that might be used somewhere
to eliminate strategic voting. (not a very scientific description but I
I've only partially followed this debate, but I'm somewhat curious...
Was
Mike the first person to suggest that defeat strength in a pairwise
comparison should be defined by the number of winning votes, rather than
the number of winning votes minus the number of losing votes? If so, when
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