Hello Eric,
I think many people might really use strategy that is harmful to them
but looks promising at first sight.
They might falsely think like in the lines of the Borda method: "last
position in the ballot gives least points"
Or in terms of ranking: "one negative point to the last candidat
Hello James,
You wondered how familiar I am with different strategies etc. I have
studied the voting methods for quite some time and I have visited also
Blake Cretney's web site. I think I know most of the basic stuff but
unfortunately have not had time to follow all the details of the
disc
Hello James,
Thanks for the excellent mail. I still found some points where
different definitions lead to different conclusions. See (lengthy)
comments below.
BR, Juho
On Mar 17, 2005, at 09:51, James Green-Armytage wrote:
I suggest that most public elections will fall within the region of
"som
Bart Ingles wrote:
Eric Gorr wrote:
I believe the numbers you are looking for are contained within the
published results at:
http://www.sfgov.org/site/uploadedfiles/election/results.htm
I've seen the round-by-round result on the SF web site, but I believe
you'd have to crunch through the ballot
Eric Gorr wrote:
I believe the numbers you are looking for are contained within the
published results at:
http://www.sfgov.org/site/uploadedfiles/election/results.htm
I've seen the round-by-round result on the SF web site, but I believe
you'd have to crunch through the ballots to know exactly ho
Kevin--
You suggested that there could be a method in which a majority, who have
transitive strict preferences among all the candidates, could ensure that
some Y won't win, by alternately voting ">" and "=" in their rankings. You
said that's a silly way of voting, and that, because a silly way o
I'm correcting what I assume was a typo in the subject line, and
replying to selected quotes below:
On 17 Mar 2005 at 14:23 PST, Forest Simmons wrote:
> Ted went on to say ...
>> If you still want to call it "ACC", you could use this analogy to
>> explain it: a long time back, I read an article wh
Here's most of a message I sent to Ted Stern recently, but I'm not sure if
his new email server allowed it past the filter.
I like the idea of Grade ballots and the use of Cardinal Ratings for seeding
the bubble sort.
I'm not sure how much temptation there would be to distort the ratings, thoug
Date: Thu, 17 Mar 2005 13:14:10 -0800
From: Araucaria Araucana <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: [EM] Re: Total Approval Ranked Pairs
Ted wrote:
About the Approval Cutoff Candidate, as both name and concept. In
general I think it is an excellent idea, but I would still suggest
using graded ballots (gra
On 16 Mar 2005 at 17:32 PST, Forest Simmons wrote:
> Russ worried that putting in an approval cutoff might be too costly.
>
> The cost is the same as adding one extra candidate, the ACC
> (Approval Cutoff Candidate).
>
> Voters that truncate the ACC candidate are implicitly approving all
> of their
Jobst, the more I think about it, the more I like your idea (influenced by
Kevin) of requiring full majorities for strong defeat.
I don't think that we lose any of the basic properties, and it solves
Kevin's 49C, 24B, 27A>B problem without the additional randomness that I
was beginning to accep
James,
You wrote (Tue.Mar.8):
I recognize that Raynaud fails monotonicity, but personally I don't
consider that to be a big deal. Raynaud is arguably the most
intuitively obvious pairwise tally method. I'm not willing to argue
that Raynaud is superior to defeat-dropping pairwise methods, but I d
Mike,
--- MIKE OSSIPOFF <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> You replied:
>
> That would be missing the point. If WDSC makes a meaningful guarantee, there
> shouldn't be a silly, meaningless way of satisfying it.
>
> I reply:
>
> WDSC doesn't make a guarantee, meaningful or otherwise. Methods that comp
Juho Laatu wrote:
This is interesting. I believe that when Condorcet based methods are
taken into use there really will be large number of people who will put
the strongest competitor of their favourite candidate last on their
ballot - just to make sure that she will not be elected.
I agree this
Bart Ingles wrote:
It would be interesting to know how many ballots were exhausted because
the voter voluntarily ranked only one or two candidates, versus the
number exhausted because all three permitted choices were eliminated.
Put another way, how many three-ranked ballots did not contain a vo
Hi Juho,
Various replies follow, on the subject of voter strategy.
>Condorcet is close to a dream come true in the sense that it almost
>provides a perfect solution that eliminates all strategies from
>elections and frees people to giving sincere votes only.
This is true only i
Dear Mike,
I wrote (16 March 2005):
> I replied that it cannot be said that you proposed wv
> methods in general because you didn't propose a general
> concept.
You wrote (17 March 2005):
> But I did propose a "general concept". As I said in my
> previouis posting about this, I clearly and unmist
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