James Green-Armytage wrote:
Sequential dropping is most useful as a very-simple alternative, so it
should have a simple, non-technical-sounding name. Any ideas? Let's
brainstorm...
loop cutting (method)?
simple cycle breaking (method)?
...
* serial tiebreaker
* "musical chairs" tiebreaker
Rob
---
MIKE OSSIPOFF nkklrp-at-hotmail.com |EMlist| wrote:
Dear Markus--
Levin & Nalebuff said:
For our purposes, we assume that voters rank all the
candidates on their ballots, and do not score candidates
as ties
I haven't followed this discussion, but let me give my view based on my
understanding of th
Dear Markus--
Levin & Nalebuff said:
For our purposes, we assume that voters rank all the
candidates on their ballots, and do not score candidates
as ties
I reply:
Here are two possibilities: for what "For our purposes..."
1. "For our purposes..." means that Levin & Nalebuff are telling what
Simp
Hi Gervase,
Some quick replies follow...
>If you want something a bit more strategic resistant, Reynaud(Margins)
>might be a good step up. I was thinking about this recently in relation
>to the recent Approval 'Elimination' Condorcet thread and the Reynaud
>thread. Chris Benham mentio
Sequential dropping is most useful as a very-simple alternative, so it
should have a simple, non-technical-sounding name. Any ideas? Let's
brainstorm...
loop cutting (method)?
simple cycle breaking (method)?
...
my best,
James
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em f
> Date: Wed, 23 Mar 2005 09:15:52 +0200
> From: Juho Laatu
> Subject: [EM] Sincere methods
> I already gave some support to seeing MinMax (margins) ("least
> additional votes") as one potential "sincere method" (criticism
> received too).
If you want something a bit more strategic resistant, Reyn
Dear James!
I'm very confused about CWO. If I understand it correctly, it will not
at all help avoiding strategic voting but will rather introduce a new
and very drastic way to strategically alter the outcome! Assume there's
a cycle, like
x A>B>C
y B>C>A
z C>A>B
with x,y,z < n/2, and assume
James Green-Armytage jarmyta-at-antioch-college.edu |EMlist| wrote:
James G-A replying to Russ
My first comment is that this proposal is significantly more complicated
than my (or Kevin's) "Ranked Approval Voting" (RAV) proposal, which
simply drops the least approved candidate until a CW is fou
Forest Simmons simmonfo-at-up.edu |EMlist| wrote:
On Sun, 20 Mar 2005, Jobst Heitzig wrote:
Dear Russ!
I completely agree with what you wrote!
Just like you, I think that
an "ideal" election
method must integrate both ordinal and cardinal information, and the
cardinal information should be simple
On 22 Mar 2005 at 14:04 UTC-0800, Rob LeGrand wrote:
> Jobst wrote:
>> Unfortunately, I get the impression that in the following example
>> there is no such equilibrium:
>>
>> 3 D>C>A>B
>> 3 D>A>B>C
>> 5 A>B>C>D
>> 4 C>B>D>A
>>
>> So, can anybody forecast what will happen with these preferences
>>
On Wed, Mar 23, 2005 at 06:50:26PM +0100, Jobst Heitzig wrote:
> Dear Andrew and Juho!
>
> You seem to agree that...
> > ...if votes are sincere, the best voting method would
> > not be Condorcet at all. It would be for each voter to assign a
> > number of points to each candidate representing the
>
> The term "defeat-dropper" is a self-explanatory
> newly coined (perhaps slang) reference to the pairwise
> methods that "drop defeats", such as Ranked Pairs,
> Beat Path, River etc.that are all equivalent when
> there are three candidates. SCRIRVE and Raynaud are
> examples of Condorcet meth
Mike,
> And forgive me if I missed your precise and complete
defintiion of your Defeat-Dropper method. Would you
precisely and completely define your Defeat-Dropper
method now?
The term "defeat-dropper" is a self-explanatory
newly coined (perhaps slang) reference to the pairwise
methods that "d
Hello Jobst,
Good viewpoints. I think I agree with most of this.
To me the limit of useful information for voting is quite close to "rankings can be taken into account". I could add something small and leave some problematic strategic ranking cases out but these are just details.
I think vote
Hi,
This is a response to James Green-Armytage's mail
http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2005-March/015125.html
You asked me to read the mail after I had defended the margin based methods. Now I did - or actually I had read the mail ealier but only now find so
Dear Andrew and Juho!
You seem to agree that...
> ...if votes are sincere, the best voting method would
> not be Condorcet at all. It would be for each voter to assign a
> number of points to each candidate representing the utility they
> ascribe to that candidate. The candidate with the largest t
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> I would think that if votes are sincere, the best voting method would not be> Condorcet at all. It would be for each voter to assign a number of points to> each candidate representing the utility they ascribe to that candidate. The> candidate with the largest total ut
> From: Juho Laatu <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>
> Hello All,
>
> In an earlier mail I brought up the question what would be the best
> Condorcet completion method in the case that we would have the luxury
> of sincere votes. I would appreciate your comments on this.
> Any opinions?
...
I would think
Hello Eric,
I don't want to say that Concorcet methods would decrease sincerity. I'll explain my thinking briefly.
I think it would be good to define voting methods in two steps. First the best voting method for sincere votes. This is the target where we aim. But because people may vote strateg
Juho Laatu wrote:
Hello All,
In an earlier mail I brought up the question what would be the best
Condorcet completion method in the case that we would have the luxury of
sincere votes.
Why do you believe sincere votes are a luxury with respect to a good
condorcet completion method?
--
== Eric
Russ Paielli wrote:
Eric Gorr eric-at-ericgorr.net |EMlist| wrote:
Russ Paielli wrote:
What is too complicated? Nobody knows the exact answer to that
question, of course, but let me tell you what I think.
I think you can forget about any method that cannot be explained in
two or three sentences
I forgot to mention something important before I sent my last post, "CWO
may be worth fighting for". I wrote:
> Here is one possible progression for single winner elections (to decide
>on representatives):
>1. plurality and runoffs
>2. IRV
>3. CWO-IRV
>4. ranked pairs(wv), with C
Dear Mike,
the assumption that each voter casts a complete ranking
of all candidates is on page 5 (i.e. in the introduction)
of their paper (Jonathan Levin, Barry Nalebuff, "An
Introduction to Vote-Counting Schemes", Journal of
Economic Perspectives, vol. 9, no. 1, pp. 3--26,
Winter 1995):
> For
Russ Paielli Sent: Wednesday, March 23, 2005 5:12 AM
> As far as I know, STV is a generalization of IRV for multi-winner elections.
Or maybe IRV is special case, simplification of STV. (Which was the chicken
and which was the egg?)
> So the reasons for IRV's popularity apply to STV to some ext
24 matches
Mail list logo
