Dear Mike,
I wrote (28 March 2005):
> Suppose V is the number of voters.
>
> Suppose d[X,Y] is the number of voters who
> strictly prefer candidate X to candidate Y.
>
> Suppose p(z)[X,Y] is the strength of the strongest
> path from candidate X to candidate Y when the strength
> of a pairwise defe
Gervase,
--- Gervase Lam <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > Results:
> >
> > CDTT,MMPO,FPP: 13.7 LNHarm, 1177.5 LNHelp.
> > Schulze(wv): 193 LNHarm, 750 LNHelp.
> > Schulze(marg): 306 LNHarm, 675.5 LNHelp.
> > Schulze(opp): 291.5 LNHarm, 838.5 LNHelp.
>
> How well does just 'Plain' MMPO fare in this
I said in a previous message:
"For instance, with the candidate lineup of James' example (Kerry, Bush,
Dean), I'd rate them all zero, because none of them is any good, and none of
them deserves a vote."
I meant that I'd give _minimum_ points to all three candidates, Kerry, Bush,
and Dean. So if
Ralph--
I'd said:
With CR, it's transparently obvious that no one has any reason to
not give maximum points to their favorite--that giving maximum points
to compromise Kerry is in no way weakened by also giving maximim
points to favorite Nader.
You replied:
You are surely mistaken. There will peopl
Chris described a kind of voting and asked me...what I would call it.
I said "offensive order-reversal", but that was a hasty incorrect answer,
based on how I've defined offensive strategy.
I've defined offensive strategy as strategy intended to take victory from a
CW or to elect someone in viol
Chris--
You said:
Mike,
It obviously facilitates more fruitful discussion at
EM, and promotes clear thinking if there is some
standardization of terms ("jargon") for such (what
some consider) important things as distinct
strategies.
I reply:
Oh, then that means that I should adopt and start using
I'd said:
Yes, but to outdo a majority pairwise vote, it's necessary
for that MPV to be in a cycle of MPVs _all of which are at
least as strong as it is_.
You say:
In 1997, I proposed the following method (Schulze method,
Schwartz sequential dropping, cloneproof Schwartz sequential
dropping, beatpa
> Date: Sun, 27 Mar 2005 19:24:00 +0200 (CEST)
> From: Kevin Venzke
> Subject: [EM] LNHarm performance: CDTT and Schulze
> Results:
>
> CDTT,MMPO,FPP: 13.7 LNHarm, 1177.5 LNHelp.
> Schulze(wv): 193 LNHarm, 750 LNHelp.
> Schulze(marg): 306 LNHarm, 675.5 LNHelp.
> Schulze(opp): 291.5 LNHarm, 838.5 L
> Date: Sat, 26 Mar 2005 00:01:02 +0200
> From: Juho Laatu
> Subject: Re: [EM] Sincere methods
> On Mar 24, 2005, at 03:00, Gervase Lam wrote:
> > If you want something a bit more strategic resistant, Reynaud(Margins)
> > might be a good step up.
> Should I thus read your comment so that you see
For those who are not ready to consider randomization, I suggest that you
at least consider the ballot type and its utilization for gathering
the pairwise and approval information (steps 1 through 3, below).
(Ninety percent seriously) I suggest that we start with any good method
that makes good
Basic Approval Strategies:
1. Given a list L of winning probabilities for the various alternatives,
you should approve an alternative A if and only if it is more likely that
the winner will be worse than A than that it will be better than A.
That's the recommendation when the alternatives are ra
Mike,
It obviously facilitates more fruitful discussion at
EM, and promotes clear thinking if there is some
standardization of terms ("jargon") for such (what
some consider) important things as distinct
strategies.
You refuse to use or even cooperate with Blake's term
"Burying" because.?? Th
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