On Mar 30, 2005, at 02:53, Gervase Lam wrote:
Should I thus read your comment so that you see MinMax (margins) as a
sincere method (the best one, or just one good sincere method) whose
weaknesses with strategic voting can best be patched by using Raynaud
(Margins)?
Roughly speaking yes, but not ex
Forest:
You were the first proponent of the Approval strategy that I call
Better-Than-Expectation. It's certainly one of the best, maybe the best
unless the voter has a strong opinion about 2 frontrunners, or about
whether, for a particular candidate, the threat of someone worse winning is
wor
Markus--
You said:
BeatpathWinner _is_ SSD _is_ CSSD in so far as all of them
share this property:
If p(z)[A,B] > p(z)[B,A], then candidate B must be
elected with zero probability.
If you don't agree with this then please post an example
where this is not true.
I reply:
If sharing a property ma
Dear Friends,
Some of you might enjoy looking at this abstract for a talk that Noga
Alon gave at the Courant Institute of Mathematical Sciences last night.
http://www.math.nyu.edu/~pach/geom_seminar/spring_2005/alon032905abs.ps
You can find the papers related to this talk on the web at Noga Alon'
> Date: Thu, 24 Mar 2005 01:00:12 +
> From: Gervase Lam
> Subject: Re: [EM] Sincere methods
> If you want something a bit more strategic resistant, Reynaud(Margins)
> might be a good step up.
Schulze(Margins) (also known as Cloneproof Schwartz Sequential Dropping
and Beatpath etc...) is poss
> Date: Sun, 27 Mar 2005 19:24:00 +0200 (CEST)
> From: Kevin Venzke
> Subject: [EM] LNHarm performance: CDTT and Schulze
> I wrote a simulation to measure the rate of LNHarm failures under
> certain circumstances. I've used it to compare a CDTT method,
> Schulze(wv), Schulze(margins), and Schulze(
Dear Forest!
You wrote:
> I wonder if the following Approval Margins Sort (AMS) is equivalent to
> your Approval Margins method:
>
> 1. List the alternatives in order of approval with highest approval at
> the top of the list.
>
> 2. While any adjacent pair of alternatives is out of order pairw
Dear Ted!
You wrote:
> Chris & Jobst: Please take careful note -- the DMC defeat strength
> assertion has not been proved rigorously, to my knowledge! It is
> worth a very careful look before basing any other assumptions on it.
The following proves that the only immune candidate is the least
app
On Wed, 30 Mar 2005, Forest Simmons wrote:
Chris,
I wonder if the following Approval Margins Sort (AMS) is equivalent to your
Approval Margins method:
1. List the alternatives in order of approval with highest approval at the
top of the list.
2. While any adjacent pair of alternatives is out of
On 30 Mar 2005 at 10:51 UTC-0800, Forest Simmons wrote:
> Chris,
>
> I wonder if the following Approval Margins Sort (AMS) is equivalent to
> your Approval Margins method:
>
> 1. List the alternatives in order of approval with highest approval at the
> top of the list.
>
> 2. While any adjacent pai
Chris,
I wonder if the following Approval Margins Sort (AMS) is equivalent to
your Approval Margins method:
1. List the alternatives in order of approval with highest approval at the
top of the list.
2. While any adjacent pair of alternatives is out of order pairwise ...
among all such pairs
On 30 Mar 2005 at 06:51 UTC-0800, Chris Benham wrote:
> Jobst,
> You wrote (Thur.Mar.24):
>
> "First, I'd like to emphasize that DMC, AWP, and AM
> can be thought of as being essentially the same method
> with only different definition of defeat strength, so
> it seems quite natural to compare them
Dear Chris!
You wrote:
> Jobst,
> You and Marcus are (often) very quick responders!
> Unfortunately "Democratic Fair Choice" incorporates
> more than one feature to which I'm allergic.
Sorry to hear of your allergies...
> I am strongly of the view that as far as possible,
> the result of the e
Jobst,
You and Marcus are (often) very quick responders!
Unfortunately "Democratic Fair Choice" incorporates
more than one feature to which I'm allergic. As I put
it in a previous post:
I am strongly of the view that as far as possible,
the result of the election should be determined purely
by th
Dear Chris!
You wrote:
> I like this table.
Thanks.
> Doesn't AM look like the most "natural" and "balanced"?
Yes, but that's only an aesthetical judgement...
> I was wondering if it is possible in AM for a
> candidate who is both the sincere CW and sincere AW to
> successfully Buried, and I'
Jobst,
You wrote (Thur.Mar.24):
"First, I'd like to emphasize that DMC, AWP, and AM
can be thought of as being essentially the same method
with only different definition of defeat strength, so
it seems quite natural to compare them in detail as
you started.
Recall that the DMC winner is the uniqu
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