Re: [EM] summary of Condorcet anti-strategy measures

Dear Chris, Some replies follow, on the topic of enhanced Condorcet versions... (in reference to strong/weak preference option (S/WPO)) I think this was proposed a long time ago by Steve Eppley. That sounds right. Do you happen to have a link to his defining post? In

Re: [EM] Schulze's method is BeatpathWinner

Dear Mike, you wrote (1 April 2005): SSD isn't a special case of BeatpathWinner. SSD and BeatpathWinner are two dilfferent methods that can give two different outcomes wilth the same ballot-set, as in the example that I posted yesterday. In an example such as that, BeatpathWinner and SSD

[EM] Re: Definite Majority Choice, AWP, AM

Forest, Jobst, Ted and others, At one point I proposed something very like DMC, which I referred to as Condorcet completed by Approval Elimination. When I first proposed Approval Margins (AM), I wrote that I was scratching the other method because I'd discovered that it was vulnerable to (a form

[EM] Ranked Pairs tiebreaker scheme

Hello, Is this Ranked Pairs tie-breaking method usable?: Suppose AB and CD are of equal strength as strength is being defined. If B is not D and one of B and D defeats the other pairwise, then rank AB ahead of CD if D defeats B, or vice versa if B defeats D. Else (when B is D, or B and D tie

Re: [EM] Ranked Pairs tiebreaker scheme

Kevin Venzke wrote: Hello, Is this Ranked Pairs tie-breaking method usable?: Suppose AB and CD are of equal strength as strength is being defined. If B is not D and one of B and D defeats the other pairwise, then rank AB ahead of CD if D defeats B, or vice versa if B defeats D. Else (when B is D,

Re: [EM] Ranked Pairs tiebreaker scheme

Eric, --- Eric Gorr [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Else (when B is D, or B and D tie pairwise) rank AB ahead of CD if A defeats C pairwise, and CD ahead of AB if C defeats A pairwise. Looks interesting. What would you do if neither A nor C defeat the other pairwise? Maybe throw a

Re: [EM] Ranked Pairs tiebreaker scheme

Kevin Venzke wrote: Eric, --- Eric Gorr [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Else (when B is D, or B and D tie pairwise) rank AB ahead of CD if A defeats C pairwise, and CD ahead of AB if C defeats A pairwise. Looks interesting. What would you do if neither A nor C defeat the other pairwise? Maybe throw a

Re: [EM] Sincere methods

Hello Juho, --- Juho Laatu [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : I think margins is one natural sincere voting method. For practical purposes I accept also methods that do not make sense as sincere methods. They may be needed in order to fight against strategic voting. - someone might claim that

[EM] Re: weak strong preferences, Steve Eppley EM post , 5 Mar.1997

Chris quoted Steve Eppley's post at: http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/1997-March/001392.html Hi Chris, Thank you for the reference! That basically looks like the same idea, with only subtle differences. I agree that S/WPO strikes a pretty good

Re: [EM] Sincere methods

Juho Laatu [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: If someone is interested, I would be happy to see examples e.g. on how the SVM: MinMax (margins), PVM: MinMax (margins) case (this one should be an easy target) can be fooled in large public elections (with no more exact information than some opinion polls

Re: [EM] Re: Definite Majority Choice, AWP, AM

James G-A replying to Ted, on the subject of AWP and DMC... I agree that AWP (have you decided to pick between RP, Beatpath or River?) No, I haven't chosen, nor do I feel the need to choose. I consider all three of these base methods to be very good, and I see no particular reason to

[EM] Typo

I said: For those rings, you're increasing your summed distance to candidates on the rings. That's true of other rings on the sphere about those points, and it's true for other spherical shells about P. Instead of ...candidates on the rings., I meant ...voters on the rings. Mike Ossipoff

Re: [EM] CWO may be worth fighting for

Hi Jobst, I understand your point. I have been aware of it already, and I think that it is valid, but I suggest that you are overstating its severity. First, I agree that CWO may produce a counterintuitive result in some situations, as you describe. However, the winner

[EM] Schulze's method isn't BeatpathWinner

I'd said (referring to BeatpathWinner SSD): Same ballot-set. Different winner-sets. Different methods. And, as I said, BeatpathWinner is one method, and SSD is one method, and they are different methods. You say: Example: The Borda method chooses that candidate whose Borda score is maximal.

Re: [EM] James--Majority rule definition, 29 March, 0632 GMT

This is James G-A, replying to Mike Ossipoff, on the topic of possible majority rule definitions, Mike: One way (but only one way :-) of defining a majority pairwise preference is as an instance of a majority praeferring one candidate to another. And one way of defining the strength of that