[EM] Mike: strategy (brief)

2005-04-08 Thread James Green-Armytage
James G-A replying to Mike, on a few strategy-related issues... Mike: > >For instance, I said, and contnue to say that emphasis on methods' >"vulnerability" to strategy completely misses the point. >So does the treatment of what you call "burying strategy" as a separate >method problem from the

[EM] Mike: majority rule

2005-04-08 Thread James Green-Armytage
James G-A replying to Mike, on the topic of majority rule definitions... > James: >Definition of strong majority rule criterion: If voters cast ballots >sincerely, and the voting method in question always chooses a member of >the sincere Smith set, the method passes the strong majority rule >criter

Re: [EM] a majority rule definition based on the Smith set

2005-04-08 Thread James Green-Armytage
Hi Kevin, thanks for your reply! My answers follow… James: >> Okay then, how do you define majority rule? The question I'm interested >> in is not whether we can invent an interesting new concept; the question >> is what is the most appropriate criterion to be identified as "majority >> rul

Re: [EM] Kevin, 8 April, '05, 0533 GMT

2005-04-08 Thread Kevin Venzke
Mike, I don't consider it useful to not consider Plurality a ranked method. I've explained that in the past. I know you have a different view. --- MIKE OSSIPOFF <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit : > But consider this example: > > AB66, BC51, CA51 > > The Beatpath Criterion that you quoted doesn't s

Re: [EM] AWP versus AM (was "summary of Condorcet anti-strategy measures")

2005-04-08 Thread James Green-Armytage
James G-A replying to Chris Benham, on the topic of AWP versus AM and DMC... Chris: >AM also frustrates the >Buriers; except in one where AWP "cheated" by electing >a "strongly defeated" candidate (pairwise beaten by a >candidate with a higher approval score). > James: > "I'm sorry, but I don't t

[EM] 1 example in which Plurality fails all the defensive strategy criteria

2005-04-08 Thread MIKE OSSIPOFF
This example consists of voter preferences. 40: ABC means that 40% of the voters prefer A to B and to C, and prefer B to C. 40: ABC 31: B 29: CBA With those preferences,, Plurality fails WDSC, SDSC, SFC, GSFC, FBC, PBC, & PSBC, among others. On another day I'll demonstrate that, but you can ap

[EM] typo

2005-04-08 Thread MIKE OSSIPOFF
I said that 30% vote for X, 30% vote for Z, and 60% vote for Y. I meant that 40% vote for Y. Mike Ossipoff _ Express yourself instantly with MSN Messenger! Download today - it's FREE! http://messenger.msn.click-url.com/go/onm00200471

[EM] Re: Ballot Design

2005-04-08 Thread Araucaria Araucana
On 8 Apr 2005 at 08:38 UTC-0700, Lloyd Caesar wrote: > This may be a bit off topic. It's about art not science. How should > an STV ballot be designed for ease of use and ease of counting. (For > the rules, let's say, paper ballots, computer count, manual recount > if necessary) A simple list of

RE: [EM] Ballot Design

2005-04-08 Thread James Gilmour
Lloyd Caesar Sent: Friday, April 08, 2005 4:38 PM > How should an STV ballot be designed for ease of use > and ease of counting. (For the rules, let's say, paper > ballots, computer count, manual recount if necessary) > A simple list of names with spaces next to them > for writing in a number is c

[EM] Ballot Design

2005-04-08 Thread Lloyd Caesar
This may be a bit off topic. It's about art not science. How should an STV ballot be designed for ease of use and ease of counting. (For the rules, let's say, paper ballots, computer count, manual recount if necessary) A simple list of names with spaces next to them forwriting in a number is clear