Hello James,
See embedded comments below.
Best Regards,
Juho
On Apr 17, 2005, at 13:19, James Green-Armytage wrote:
Hi Juho. Here is a reply to your April 4 post, where you suggested
that
large scale strategic manipulation in Condorcet methods will be
unlikely.
I like your professional wrestler
On Apr 17, 2005, at 21:58, Kevin Venzke wrote:
plurality
That doesn't work unless you count the total number of people "who
think
that the winner is not the first choice of the most voters." Otherwise
you have everyone revolting who doesn't get their first choice.
Yes. I'm just trying to demonstr
Hello Michael,
This is maybe not what you were looking for, but self-organizing maps
(or other corresponding approximating methods) could be useful (and
computationally feasible) in this kind of classroom problems.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-organizing_map
http://www.arch.usyd.edu.au/~r
James--
You say:
You've misunderstood me. I'm not saying that margins and winning votes
will ever produce worse results than IRV with respect to expressed
preferences. What I'm worried about is the possibility of their producing
worse results than IRV with respect to sincere preferences.
On 22 Apr 2005 at 19:46 UTC-0700, Russ Paielli wrote:
Araucaria Araucana araucaria.araucana-at-gmail.com |EMlist| wrote:
>> Well, that has a kernel of truth to it -- candidates are going to
>> try to game the system, whatever it is. So whatever method you set
>> up, it needs to have a certain unpr
On 22 Apr 2005 at 18:42 UTC-0700, Russ Paielli wrote:
Araucaria Araucana araucaria.araucana-at-gmail.com |EMlist| wrote:
>
>> Consider this case. Original true preferences:
>> 27: A>B
>> 24: B>A 49: C
>> A is the Condorcet winner. Now consider what happens if B defects
>> via
>> truncation:
